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INTRODUCTION 
As we all know, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights1 (TRIPs) is about intellectual property (IP).  
However, TRIPs also contains a smattering of antitrust provisions.2  Do 
these provisions have any normative significance at all?  And, if so, what 
is it?  These questions may be looked at in a number of ways. 
First, consider the TRIPs antitrust provisions in an international 
antitrust perspective.  While the debate on the desirability of 
establishing different types of world antitrust rules is still underway, we 
may wish to take stock of the international antitrust rules that are 
currently in place.  Even though these rules, on the whole, do not 
amount to much, they still may possess some attraction for scholars.  
This is because they have been around for a while and, thus, may 
provide us with some relevant evidence and possibly insights on 
whatever next step we may have in mind.  In the latter regard, the 
competition rules contained in TRIPs are more likely to prove helpful 
than, say, the diminutive mini-body of antitrust rules contained in 
General Agreement on Trade in Services3 (GATS) or the so-called U.N. 
 
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
2. Throughout this Article, the expressions “antitrust,” “antitrust law,” “competition 
law,” and “competition rules” are used synonymously. 
3. See Maria Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade and 
the Role of the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON THE 50TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 609, 620–621 (1999). 
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Set4 because they are somewhat more detailed and comprehensive than 
the former and because, in contrast to the latter, they consist of “hard” 
rather than “soft” law. 
Second, consider the competition law component of TRIPs as 
another chapter of the eternally self-renovating tale concerning the 
intersection between IP and antitrust.  This perspective may also prove 
rather interesting.  Indeed, the corresponding issues that originally 
emerged at the domestic level in the United States or Germany and 
subsequently obtained a regional dimension in the European Union 
during the last five decades have in the meantime reached the 
transnational stage thanks to TRIPs. 
While I will not totally ignore these two perspectives, I do not intend 
to directly address them either.  Rather, I propose to leave them in the 
background and, accordingly, concentrate on a different, more 
specific—if not unrelated—set of questions: 
(1) Is it possible to distill a coherent set of rules from the fragmented 
antitrust provisions within TRIPs? 
(2) Do these rules imply pro-competitive choices of more general 
relevance?  And, if so, do they have any impact on the interpretation 
and application of other provisions contained in TRIPs? 
(3) How wide is the spectrum of TRIPs-compliant, pro-competitive 
choices available to Members, and what are the options available under 
it? 
(4) Does TRIPs contain within its antitrust portions a remedy to the 
gradual “ratcheting up” of IP protection that has been taking place in 
the last few decades and was decisively reinforced by TRIPs itself? 
There is no denying that, by asking these questions, I am making 
quite a number of assumptions.  The very idea that we are in a phase of 
overprotection of IP is theoretically questionable and empirically 
disputable.  In fact, we should be ready to acknowledge that it is, in 
principle, dubious to talk about overprotection—as well as of 
underprotection—of IP once we admit that determining the optimal 
rate of innovation implies a conceptual impossibility.5  On the other 
 
4. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices, G.A. Res. 35/63, 19 I.L.M. 813 (Dec. 5, 1980) [hereinafter U.N. 
Set]. 
5. Indicated by a literature as diverse as the canonical writing of Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962), and by 
the heterodox work of JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS:  LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996). 
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hand, if we cast aside the theoretical level and try what may be 
described as an educated guess on the matter, then one has to concede 
that the symmetrically opposite view, according to which we are 
witnessing a phase of underprotection, has its supporters.6 
However, my own hunch is in the opposite direction; and, as 
disputable as this view may be, I think I should dispense myself from 
developing a full argument to support it in order to avoid changing the 
subject of this work.  Nevertheless, as I ultimately propose to inquire 
whether an antidote to IP overprotection is to be found in TRIPs, I 
should say something about the assumed “disease” before proceeding to 
assess the appropriateness of the proposed “cure.”  However, even in 
this approach, I will confine myself to just a few remarks. 
The reasons ordinarily given to account for the ratcheting up of IP 
protection tend to focus on changes in the characteristics of either 
technological innovation itself or of the legal process shaping its 
regulation. 
In the former perspective, it has been argued that in the last few 
decades even commercially valuable innovation has shown a tendency 
to be incremental rather than discrete while at the same time bearing 
the very know-how that makes it valuable “on its face.”7  Such 
innovation, it is argued, may fail to meet the high-access requirements 
of patent law and simultaneously turn out to be unprotectable through 
trade secret law.  The resulting failure of traditional forms of IP 
protection is seen as responsible for generating an increased call by 
interested circles for the establishment of a variety of mini-monopolies 
in the form of hybrid and sui generis regimes, often granting full 
exclusivity under attenuated access requirements. 
A similar and complementary argument is derived from the 
perception that the originally extended trajectory that leads from the 
scientific enterprise to its application on the market has collapsed or 
shrunk to a bare minimum in areas such as the life sciences and digital 
technology.  Here, the trend seems to consist of moving IP protection 
 
6. For a specially strident enunciation, see Mickey Cantor, Film Pirates Are Robbing 
Us All, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at Ak. 
7. As shown in the case of plant varieties, semiconductor chips, databases and even 
biotechnology.  For a full treatment of this line of thought, see the abundant work of Jerome 
H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2432 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids], and Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global 
Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279 (2004) [hereinafter Maskus & Reichman, 
Globalization]. 
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upstream and in having it cover disembodied knowledge rather than 
tangible material embodiments; and, where this is the case, the resulting 
power may be conferred “not only in product markets, but also in 
innovation markets.”8 
These technology-focused accounts seem to me complemented 
rather than displaced by legal-process scholarship.  This latter strand of 
literature, in turn, points to a shift in legal change paradigms that 
occurred in the final decades of the last century.  Indeed, regulatory 
competition, inducing sovereigns to engage in a race to the top and to 
imitate whatever increase in protection is noted in other jurisdictions,9 
gives a quite straightforward account of the reasons why the dual calls 
for hybrid regimes and upstream protection have been heeded rather 
than disregarded on either side of the Atlantic and apparently also in 
Japan.  In turn, the mechanism of “issue linkage” has proved perfectly 
apt to persuade even recalcitrant jurisdictions in the periphery to accept, 
as a level playing field, whatever high standards of protection have in 
the meantime been generated in the center of the world economy by the 
workings of regulatory competition. 
Having said so much—or, rather, so little—we may turn back to our 
original questions.  And, in doing so, we should proceed first to an 
analysis of the contents and architecture of those TRIPs provisions that 
specifically deal with antitrust law. 
 
8. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual 
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431, 433 (2004) 
(emphasis omitted).  In specific connection with the process of extension of protectable 
subject matter to disembodied knowledge, see Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual 
Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 401, 416–17 
(2004). 
9. The whole gamut of possible regulatory competition outcomes was encapsulated in 
two famous dissenting opinions by Justice Brandeis quite a long time ago.  Either the 
different competing jurisdictions are seen as laboratories experimenting with diverse legal 
rules to strike whatever balance between conflicting interests appears appropriate to the 
relevant constituencies, State Ice Corp. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting), or, in the alternative, they may engage in a “race of laxity,” Louis K. Liggett Co. 
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557–559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), to favor concentrated interests 
(typically, business interests) or cut down on the level of protection of dispersed interests 
(typically, outside investors’ and consumers’ interests). 
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I.  TRIPS ANTITRUST PROVISIONS 
A.  Contents and Architecture 
1.  The Relevant Provisions 
Usually commentators, in identifying TRIPs provisions dealing with 
antitrust, refer to (a) Articles 40, (b) Article 8(2), and (c) Article 31(k).10  
I suggest that we go a step beyond by including (d) Article 67 and 
possibly Article 66(2).11 
(a) Article 40, as indicated in the title of Part II, section 8 of TRIPs, 
entitled “Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual 
Licenses,” is confined to the scrutiny of “licensing practices or 
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights.”12  While the final 
two paragraphs of this provision deal with procedure (in a manner that 
closely parallels paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article IX GATS), the 
substantive part of this text is found in its first two paragraphs.  The first 
paragraph is strikingly philosophical; rather than describing behavior 
that may be subject to antitrust scrutiny, it clarifies the rationale under 
which the international community may approve of Members’ legal 
intervention to restore competition.  “Members agree that some 
licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property 
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and 
may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology.”13  It would 
seem that the “appropriate measures to prevent or control such 
practices,”14 enabled by the second paragraph, may be in compliance 
with the TRIPs provisions insofar that they are intended to reestablish 
competition in furtherance of a broad range of goals and that these 
include not only the reassertion of competition in itself but also the 
preservation of freedom of trade and—remarkably enough—the 
promotion of the transfer and dissemination of technology.15 
 
10. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 404–405; Frederick M. Abbott, Are the Competition 
Rules in the WTO TRIPs Agreement Adequate?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 687, 689–91 (2004). 
11. Following the proposal made in a brilliant essay by N. Ayse Odman, Using TRIPs 
to Make the Innovation Process Work, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 343, 351–54 (2000). 
12. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(1) (emphasis added). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. art. 40(2). 
15. It should be noted that under Article 40(2), an “adverse effect on competition in 
the relevant market” is still required.  Id.; see also Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406 n.21 (“The 
restrictive nature of a technology transfer agreement is made a necessary connecting factor 
for its control, but not a factor determining the outcome of the control.”). 
RICOLFI - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:30:13 PM 
2006] AN ANTITRUST ANTIDOTE WITHIN TRIPS? 311 
 
The second paragraph contains a non-exhaustive list of practices that 
may be outlawed or controlled by Members’ legislation.16  The list is 
drawn from clauses usually found in patent and know-how licensing 
agreements.  Nothing prevents its extension to cover trademark and 
copyright (or software) licensing—as well as other dealings in 
intellectual property—to the extent that these kinds of agreements may 
impact trade and technology transfer, even though the history of the 
negotiations leading to the signing of TRIPs suggests that the parties 
had in mind the more traditional forms of technology transfer 
agreements.17  Moreover, Members appear free to opt for per se rules 
or, in the alternative, for the resort to the rule of reason or for a 
combination of the two, as it is more likely in the context of technology 
licensing. 
However, the control and prevention are limited to licensing 
practices and conditions; therefore, it cannot encompass unilateral 
behavior, such as a refusal to deal or discriminatory behavior, even 
though it might as well also cover horizontal agreements like reciprocal 
licensing or those licensing provisions that are often to be found as 
ancillary features in patent pools and in research and development joint 
ventures. 
(b) For its own part, the provision contained in Article 8(2) is not 
subject to any such limitation.  “Appropriate measures, provided that 
they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be 
needed”18—in the judgment of Members in the process of “formulating 
or amending their laws and regulations”19—“to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology.”20  There is no question that this provision 
enables the prevention and control not only of bilateral and multilateral 
dealings—agreements between two or more parties—but also of 
unilateral behavior, including refusals to deal and other forms of 
exercising IP that may be deemed to constitute abuse. 
Once again, as in Article 40(2), measures specifically targeting 
 
16. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40(2). 
17. See supra note 4; see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL 
BUSINESS REGULATION 192–95 (2000); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS:  NORTH-
SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 79–106 (1998) (discussing 
the aborted Draft International Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer). 
18. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
19. See id. art. 8(1). 
20. See id. art. 8(2). 
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restrictions in international transfer of technology find a special place 
here.  The disjunctive “or” in Article 8(2) clarifies that adverse impact 
on the international transfer of technology may in itself be a sufficient 
basis for legislation controlling IP abuse or dealings.21 
Also, this provision makes a clear, specific reference to technology 
transfer agreements; but, it does so in order to provide a representative 
example rather than restrict the scope of its application.22 
(c) Unilateral anti-competitive behavior may also be prohibited by 
Members’ rules that have been adopted in conformity with Article 
31(k).  Even more to the point, in connection with practices 
“determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive,”23 control measures by Members may be stricter than in all 
other situations permitting compulsory licensing of a patent under 
Article 31.  Specifically, the conditions otherwise set forth in Article 
31(b) (prior request to the right holder) and Article 31(f) (limitation of 
exploitation of the licensed patent “predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member”24 resorting to compulsory licensing) 
may be waived when anti-competitive behavior by the patentee is 
established.  Moreover, in an antitrust context and in accordance with 
the second sentence of Article 31(k), “[t]he need to correct anti-
competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the 
amount of remuneration,”25 which should lead to reducing the 
remuneration under Article 31(h) to a rate lower than the “adequacy” 
level otherwise mandated by the same provision.26 
(d) Finally, I subscribe to the view27 that an antitrust component is 
also to be found within the “Transitional Arrangements” of Part VI of 
 
21. A similar point is made by Hanns Ullrich.  Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406; see also 
Odman, supra note 11, at 348–349. 
22. However, the procedural provisions of Article 40(2)–(3) can come into play only in 
connection with “licensing.”  See Andreas Heinemann, Antitrust Law of Intellectual Property 
in the TRIPs Agreement of the World Trade Organization, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS:  THE 
AGREEEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 239, 
247 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); see also Odman, supra note 11, at 
350 (indicating that positive comity might come into play here, but only to the extent that the 
member state of the IP holder sees fit). 
23. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(k). 
24. Id. art. 31(f). 
25. Id. art. 31(k). 
26. On the other hand, I am not sure I can distinguish between the specific compulsory 
licensing termination requirements under Article 31(k) and the general rule under Article 
31(g). 
27. See Odman, supra note 11, at 351–53. 
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TRIPs, and more specifically, in the provisions devoted to cooperation 
duties of developed member countries towards developing and least-
developed member countries.  Accordingly, I submit that technical 
cooperation under Article 67 extends to the preparation of laws and 
regulations on the prevention of abuse of intellectual property rights, 
including anti-competitive abuses.  It may be argued that Article 66, in 
providing that “[d]eveloped country Members shall provide incentives 
to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed 
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base,”28 also implies that such incentives fully conform to 
the duties under the TRIPs only to the extent that they minimize the 
competition-restrictive features of technology licensing.29 
2.  Antitrust as TRIPs Subject Matter 
What is the relevance of the provisions sketched above within the 
larger body of TRIPs?  Language found in various parts of TRIPs 
suggests that the provisions at the intersection of antitrust and IP belong 
to the “subject matter of TRIPs.”30  Thus, Article 3(1), note three, 
clearly states that “[f]or the purposes of Articles 3 and 4, ‘protection’ [of 
intellectual property] shall include matters affecting the availability, 
acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual 
property rights specifically addressed in this Agreement.”31  It would 
appear quite plain that the anti-competitive and abusive practices 
discussed above affect the use of intellectual property rights and are 
specifically addressed in TRIPs itself; thus, they are to be considered as 
TRIPs subject matter for the purposes of Articles 3 and 4.  This 
conclusion appears confirmed by Article 63, a provision that triggers an 
obligation to make certain information publicly available, that is, 
transparent.  Even there, “the subject matter of this Agreement” is 
identified with “the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement and 
prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights.”32 
That the mini-body of antitrust within TRIPs belongs to the subject 
matter of the Agreement is a conclusion that has a number of 
 
28. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66(2). 
29. See Odman, supra note 11, at 345–46, 351–53. 
30. For a similar conclusion, see Odman, supra note 11, at 26, 15. 
31. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3(1) n.3 (emphasis added). 
32. Id. art. 63(1) (emphasis added). 
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implications.  I will come back to one of them below in Part I.B.3.  For 
the moment, I should remark that one of the consequences of 
considering the provisions sketched above as part and parcel of TRIPs is 
that the national treatment and most-favored nation treatment clauses 
under Articles 3 and 4 apply.  This should hardly come as a surprise 
because the language of note three specifically addresses the question of 
what issues are TRIPs subject matter “[f]or the purposes of Articles 3 
and 4.”33  Also, I submit that it does make sense that provisions at the 
intersection of antitrust and IP comply both with a negative obligation, 
such as the prohibition of discriminations based on nationality 
mandated by Article 3, and with a positive obligation as to the 
immediate and unconditional extension of “any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any Member to the nationals of any 
other country” to “the nationals of all other Members.”34  After all, the 
principle whereby all businesses are subject to the same rules in the 
marketplace independently of their nationality belongs to the very 
essence of competition laws around the world. 
So far, I have referred only to the substantive part of the provisions 
sketched above in Part I.A.1.  Indeed, I do have doubts that one may 
draw similar inferences in connection with their procedural parts and in 
particular with the establishment and operation of cooperation 
agreements in the field of antitrust, even though they may contribute to 
implementing Articles 40(3) and 40(4).35  Building a network of 
agreements in the field of antitrust cooperation is a time-consuming 
enterprise that experience shows must be tailored to the specifics of the 
individual countries or groups of countries.36  Experience also shows that 
these networks, once initiated, tend to expand to gradually encompass a 
larger number of jurisdictions.  However, an immediate and 
unconditional extension under a most-favored nation principle may 
prove counterproductive here.  Member A, while inclined to experiment 
on antitrust cooperation with the authorities of Member B, may retreat 
in doubt if identical rules were to be applied automatically in its 
relations with all other jurisdictions.  Therefore, it is possible to argue 
 
33. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3(1) n.3. 
34. Id. art. 4. 
35. A similar position is found in Frédéric Jenny, Globalization, Competition and 
Trade Policy:  Convergence, Divergence and Cooperation, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE 
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 315, 317–19, 320–23 (Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsuhita eds., 
2002). 
36. See Mario Monti, Cooperation Between Competition Authorities—A Vision for the 
Future, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 69, 75. 
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that—if we wish to avoid creating disincentives to the conclusion and 
gradual extension of cooperation agreements in the field of antitrust—
we should steer clear of applying to them Article 3 and particularly 
Article 4 of TRIPs.37 
3.  Enabling and Mandatory Features 
What do we make out of this set of provisions?  It has been noted 
that TRIPs “promotes a globally harmonized intellectual property 
regime” while leaving “competition policy to the sovereign 
determination of Members and their regional economic institutions,” 
thereby relying on “a patchwork transnational regime rooted in a 
multiplicity of national and regional competition laws.”38  It has also 
been remarked that by failing to consider “other potentially anti-
competitive arrangements, including mergers and acquisitions,”39 TRIPs 
adopts a narrow focus in designing the antitrust and IP intersection.40 
I agree with the descriptive part of this analysis.  Nevertheless, I 
would not subscribe to the conclusions inferred from it and certainly 
would not accept that here “expansionist intellectual property 
protection” interfaces with “reductionist competition rules.”41 
Indeed, as far as coverage is concerned, TRIPs antitrust provisions 
nicely dovetail with what is understood to be the core of classic antitrust 
law both in the United States and in the European Union, namely the 
prohibition or control of bilateral and unilateral anti-competitive 
behavior or, in other words, agreements in restraint of trade and 
monopolization (in European parlance, abuse of dominant position).  It 
is certainly true that mergers are not mentioned at all by TRIPs; 
however, this only means that Members’ freedom to institute merger 
controls and to take into account IP factors in assessing their 
admissibility is unfettered, rather than restricted. 
On the other hand, TRIPs also contemplates in Articles 8(2) and 
 
37. A similar argument has been developed by the U.S. delegation at the meeting held 
on July 17, 2003.  See World Trade Organization, Report (2003) of the Working Group on the 
Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/7 
(July 17, 2003). 
38. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 404. 
39. See id. at 405. 
40. See id. 
41. Notice, however, that the title selected by Ullrich refers to the “reductionist” 
character of competition rules not on the basis of their wording and position within TRIPs, 
but as a consequence of the more general developments of antitrust law.  See Ullrich, supra 
note 8, 417–27; see also infra Part II.B.2. 
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40(2) measures specifically targeting restrictions in international 
transfer of technology.  This feature does not necessarily belong to what 
is usually seen as the core of antitrust in U.S. and E.U. laws.42  
Nevertheless, this “development component” included in TRIPs may be 
seen as an apt complement to classic competition rules.  In the light of 
prior negotiations,43 its inclusion in an international text largely 
dedicated to North-South IP dealings appeared entirely appropriate. 
It may be argued that TRIPs antitrust provisions are enabling rather 
than mandatory in character.  This conclusion, while partly true, does 
not detract at all from their effectiveness and reach.  Indeed, most of the 
provisions listed earlier (with a few minor exceptions that we are going 
to look at briefly)44 are not mandatory because Members are by no 
means under a legal obligation to adopt them.  Surely, if a Member 
abstains from enacting provisions providing for the prohibition and 
control of IP-related anti-competitive practices, this legislative option is, 
in principle, unobjectionable and cannot lead to a complaint under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding45 (DSU), as would be the case in 
connection with a failure to enact and implement TRIPs-mandated IP 
protection. 
However, it should also be clear that in this context the enabling 
character of TRIPs is apt to expand rather than to restrict the 
lawmaking powers retained by Members at the intersection between IP 
and antitrust.  The very fact that TRIPs, while extensively and 
intensively harmonizing intellectual property, confines itself to deferring 
to Members’ lawmaking powers in this area confers a quite special 
meaning to the reticence employed by the Agreement in describing anti-
competitive or otherwise restrictive behavior and remedies available 
against them.  Indeed, saying so little in the international instrument 
means, by necessary implication, recognizing a correspondingly 
expansive latitude to the relevant domestic lawmaking powers retained 
by the Members.  In this regard, one might well say that the otherwise 
 
42. But see Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (Apr. 6, 1995); Commission Regulation 772/2004, Application of 
Art. 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 
11 (EC). 
43. See U.N. Set, supra note 4; see also supra note 14. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
45. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].  
But see Ullrich, supra note 8, at 409–10. 
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over-prescriptive TRIPs builds in this area an architecture based on 
authorization plus reticence, whereby this formula alludes to a 
combination of deference to Members’ lawmaking authority in antitrust 
and caution in detailing the extent of the powers retained by the 
Members themselves. 
It has been argued that “the open-ended wording of [Articles] 8.2. 
[and 40] suggests that [these provisions were] intended as . . . rule[s] of 
containment for national competition policy rather than as a norm 
informing the proper development of such policy.”46  My view is just the 
opposite.  Surely, an international antitrust agreement along the lines 
envisaged by section 20 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Ministerial Declaration issued in Singapore during December of 199647 
might have functioned as an effective rule of containment for national 
competition rules; and, precisely for this reason, it was rejected in 
Cancún by a coalition of developing countries two years ago.48  It is 
possible that the original intent of the trade representatives for 
developed countries in the last stage of TRIPs negotiations was to resist 
the claims made by developing countries’ representatives in this area 
and to establish some sort of a rule of containment for national 
competition policies.49  If this is so, then resorting to open-ended 
language through enabling provisions, as the ones sketched above in 
Part I.A.1, was clearly a self-defeating option.  Indeed, by refraining 
from detailing the limits set by international public law to municipal 
 
46. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 414. 
47. A discussion of the findings of the Working Group on the Interaction Between 
Trade and Competition Policy set up under section 20 of the Ministerial Declaration may be 
found in Robert D. Anderson, Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and 
International Trade:  Reflections on the Work of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy (1996–1999), in 3 WORLD TRADE FORUM, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  TRADE, COMPETITION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
235 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003). 
48. For a provisional assessment of this outcome, see Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of 
Competition Policy in Cancún:  Politics or Substance?, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. 
INTEGRATION 7, 7 (2004). 
49. For accounts of varying completeness of TRIPs negotiations in this specific area, 
see DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 61–
63, 190–93 (1998), Amy S. Dwyer, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in 4 
THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1994):  THE END GAME 
(PART I) 461, 474–75 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993), Ana María Pacón, What Will TRIPs Do 
For Developing Countries?, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS:  THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 329, 333–34, 
and Julie C. Ross & Jessica A. Wasserman, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992):  
COMMENTARY, supra, at 2245. 
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sovereigns’ jurisdiction in the area at the intersection between antitrust 
and IP, TRIPs has gone exactly the other way.  Not surprisingly, careful 
scholars have not hesitated to identify, in the enabling character of the 
relevant provisions, a confirmation of the “neofederalistic 
underpinnings of TRIPs.”50  I fully subscribe to this view in general, 
particularly in connection with the room for maneuvering left to 
Members in this field.51 
Having said so much about the expansionary thrust of the enabling 
features of TRIPs provisions at the intersection of IP and antitrust, one 
should not forget that these also incorporate quite a substantial number 
of mandatory features.  This is certainly the case in connection with the 
notion of measures “consistent with the provisions of this Agreement” 
under Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 40(2).  We shall look at these in the next 
section; however, we should note in passing that a Member adopting 
measures at the intersection of IP and antitrust in breach of Articles 
8(1), 8(2) and 40(2) would certainly be liable to be brought before a 
WTO panel under Article XXIII(1)(a) of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
Other mandatory features are also found in a number of the 
provisions discussed earlier.  Express refusal or unjustified failure to 
enter into the consultations provided for by Articles 40(3) and 40(4) 
may constitute a breach relevant under the DSU.  It cannot even be 
ruled out that Member behavior fostering anti-competitive practices by 
intellectual property rights owners that are nationals or residents of that 
Member may be in direct breach of Article 8(2).  The same conclusion 
may be reached in connection with Member tolerance of anti-
competitive practices by intellectual property rights owners who are 
nationals or residents of that Member, to the extent the same practice 
would be proscribed if its effects were felt on the domestic market of the 
same Member and would be condoned on the sole ground that its 
effects are felt only on foreign markets.52 
Similarly, an actionable breach may be found under Article 67 in the 
event a request for assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations 
on the prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights is expressly 
refused or, even if accepted, proves obviously inadequate. 
On the other hand, it has been persuasively argued that the 
obligation by developed member countries under Article 66(2) to 
 
50. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 447. 
51. For a similar conclusion, see Abbott, supra note 10, at 692–93, 698. 
52. See Odman, supra note 11, at 362–64. 
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“provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for 
the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound 
and viable technological base”53 is not directly actionable, because 
compliance with it is based on a best-efforts standard.54  I am inclined to 
agree to the extent we visualize least-developed member countries as 
plaintiffs.  However, I am not sure that the same conclusion would apply 
in the reverse situation in which the least-developed member country 
could find itself in the position of defendant as a consequence of a 
separate breach of another TRIPs provision.  Theoretical analysis 
conducted a few years ago found that this kind of situation has a high 
statistical rate of probability;55 therefore, it may be of some practical 
relevance to question whether a defendant Member could raise a clean-
hands defense or even a counterclaim on the basis of non-compliance 
with Article 66(2) by the plaintiff Member.  If this were so, then Article 
66(2) would also end up being an actionable provision under the DSU. 
4.  The Notion of Measures “Consistent with the Provisions of this 
Agreement” 
There is no doubt that the constraints posed on Members’ discretion 
to enact legislation at the intersection between IP and antitrust belong 
to the mandatory component of TRIPs and, therefore, should be taken 
seriously.  In spite of what I have been arguing about the “architecture 
of authorization plus reticence” of TRIPs in this area, the flexibility of 
Members in connection with the shaping of their laws in this field is far 
from being unfettered, as we shall presently see. 
It has been remarked that Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 40(2), by requiring 
that the measures contemplated therein are “consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement,”56 establish “only a safety zone for the 
core of intellectual property protection,”57 and that from these 
provisions it follows that Members “may not use antitrust regulation as 
 
53. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66(2). 
54. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From Negative to Positive Integration in the WTO:  
The TRIPs Agreement and the WTO Constitution, in 3 WORLD TRADE FORUM, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  TRADE, COMPETITION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 47, at 21, 32.  The opposite view is expressed by Odman, who believes the 
provision to be directly applicable.  Odman, supra note 11, at 351–54. 
55. See R.K. Burch et al., Divergent Incentives to Protect Intellectual Property:  A 
Political Economy of North-South Welfare, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 169, 178 (2000). 
56. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
57. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 410. 
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a pretext to undermine the protection of IP rights as guaranteed by the 
TRIPs Agreement.”58 
I believe that this is just about right;59 but, we should explore what 
the words “the core of IP protection” and “undermining” may exactly 
mean. 
In this regard, I should note that, historically, GATT 1949 subjected 
the exercise of domestic powers to a general test of reasonableness and 
two accompanying criteria.  Measures dealing with IP were not to be 
applied in ways that “would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail” or in ways that constitute “a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”60  The impact of these criteria over reserved 
domestic powers has usually been regarded as limited because the same 
criteria were based on traditional international trade negative 
obligations and were applied only to trade in goods.61  Thus, it is 
typically discriminatory IP treatment of imports or exports of tradeable 
goods that is subject to GATT scrutiny. 
The WTO Agreement supersedes GATT but adds additional layers 
of international rules that take the shape of both negative and positive 
obligations.  The latter include, as indicated, the most-favored nation 
treatment and a wide range of uniform minimum standards of IP 
protection.  In turn, minimum standards—built by incorporating a 
substantial number of new specific TRIPs provisions to the major 
international IP conventions—currently extend well beyond the original 
list.  In this latter context, the issue of compatibility is visualized as a 
question of levels of protection of IP assets or, more precisely, of 
achieving the mandate of uniformity in minimum standards, rather than 
as an issue of discriminatory treatment of imports and exports of 
tradeable goods. 
Whatever discretion is retained by Members and whatever flexibility 
in implementing TRIPs is granted to them, the precept of uniformity in 
minimum standards of protection and the dual principles of national 
 
58. Id. 
59. And consistent with the finding of the Panel Report, United States—Section 211 
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 8.57, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter 
Section 211 Panel Report]. 
60. These provisions are still to be found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX & XX(d), 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
61. For a similar point, see Petersmann, supra note 54, at 27, and Silke Von Lewinski, 
The Role of Copyright in Modern International Trade Law, 161 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE 
DROIT D’AUTEUR 1, 11 (1994). 
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treatment and most-favored nation treatment are mandatory in 
character and therefore to be fully respected.  Recital 6 and Article 1(1), 
while allowing for flexibility in domestic lawmaking, are also extremely 
clear in connection with the other side of the coin.  As remarked 
earlier,62 both national treatment and most-favored nation treatment 
concern not only IP protection but also the antitrust measures 
connected with it.  More importantly, flexibility is limited to methods of 
protection; conversely, the net outcome of mandated minimum 
protection is non-negotiable.  The last sentence of Article 1(1) states the 
following:  “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method 
of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal 
system and practice.”63  But the first sentence, ostensibly dealing with 
net outcomes, is crystal clear:  “Members shall give effect to the 
provisions of this Agreement.”64  Thus, while Members retain the power 
to enact domestic measures at the intersection of antitrust and IP along 
a wide spectrum of choices, these are permitted only insofar as they 
comply with national treatment and most-favored nation obligations 
and do not compromise uniform minimum standards of IP protection. 
However, even accepting this, we should question what, in each case, 
are the net outcomes of IP protection envisaged by TRIPs, and, more 
specifically, whether the interpretation of TRIPs-mandated uniform 
standards provisions should give an appropriate place to TRIPs general 
principles, and what may be the impact of the latter on the former. 
B.  The Interplay Between Antitrust Provisions and General Principles 
So far, we have looked at the contents, character and role of the 
antitrust fragments (including what I earlier called the “development 
component”) located in TRIPs.  While this may provide some reply to 
the questions initially raised in question (1) of the Introduction, we 
certainly should not rest with this kind of very broad, general finding. 
To deal with the issues raised in questions (2) and (3) of the 
Introduction, we should now explore the link between these antitrust 
provisions and the TRIPs’ general principles and inquire whether the 
interplay between the two sets of provisions may give greater relevance 
to pro-competitive values and may affect the amount of flexibility 
retained by Members.65 
 
62. See supra Part I.A.3. 
63. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
64. Id. 
65. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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More specifically, we should proceed in the direction indicated at the 
close of the previous paragraph and explore the impact that the general 
principles may have on the interpretation and application other TRIPs 
provisions, including the mandate of TRIPs-consistency and the place in 
this connection given to non-IP interests.  These interests include the 
claims for access to the existing intellectual property assets made by two 
groups:  (1) current users of technology-incorporating goods and (2) 
subsequent generations of innovators bent on generating downstream 
innovation based on prior technological knowledge.66 
In doing so, we should additionally inquire at which level a general 
principles-based approach may become relevant in Members’ law-
making process.  Should we confine consideration of pro-competitive 
inputs and of non-IP interests only to the areas specifically at the 
intersection between antitrust and IP or should we extend this approach 
to the so-called “development component,” particularly in connection 
with measures specifically targeting international transfer?  Or finally, 
should we go all the way to envisage the possibility that pro-competitive 
inputs, rather than being superimposed from the outside on the exercise 
of IP by means of ex post antitrust measures, may instead be 
incorporated ex ante from within the legislative design of individual IP 
rights? 
1.  The Historical Background 
Frankly, if we were to confine ourselves to looking at the legislative 
history of the process that led to the negotiation and adoption of TRIPs, 
we could not expect much in terms of adoption of pro-competitive 
values and flexibility intended to accommodate the claims for access to 
IP assets made by current users and future innovators.  The 
corresponding tale has been told a number of times and is roughly made 
of three ingredients. 
First, IP has become part and parcel of the new GATT-WTO67 
framework because low standards of IP protection in the South have 
 
66. On the characteristics of technological innovation that make it more dependent 
than in the past on prior strata of accumulated knowledge, see Reichman, Legal Hybrids, 
supra note 7.  For a thoughtful analysis of the standing of the claims of current users and 
future innovators within TRIPs, see Carlos M. Correa, Pro-Competitive Measures under the 
TRIPs Agreement to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countries, 4 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 481 (2001). 
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994). 
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been conceptualized as a barrier to trade, hindering or restraining the 
flow of Northern IP-incorporating goods and services toward the South 
that otherwise would have occurred on a level playing field based on 
uniform minimum conditions of IP protection.  Second, this “producer 
driven governance model”68 of IP, shaped by the “traditional export 
interests” prevailing in the North,69 has been grudgingly accepted by the 
South in exchange for the promise that the latter’s goods, including 
agricultural products and textiles, would obtain access to the rich 
consumer markets of the North.  Third, the acceptance of TRIPs-
mandated levels of IP protection was far from enthusiastic and 
unqualified.  Before adopting the “package,” developing countries 
insisted that the monopolistic potential of stronger IPs should be, at 
least in part, counterbalanced by accommodating a competition law 
component in TRIPs.70 
Against this background, we might well have expected that the 
antitrust component is just another case in which, as it often happens, 
weaker interests obtain symbolic rewards while concentrated, stronger 
interests obtain tangible benefits.71  My idea is that in TRIPs there is 
much more than that; and, that this more expansive understanding is a 
necessary implication of TRIPs’ general principles. 
2.  Recitals 5 and 6 and Articles 7 and 8(1) of TRIPs 
Let us look more closely at the text of TRIPs.  Recital 5 to the 
Preamble clearly envisages intellectual property protection not as an 
end in itself but rather as a means to achieve further ends.  The 
Members “recogniz[e] the underlying public policy objectives of 
national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including 
developmental and technological objectives.”72 Recital 6 addresses the 
specific concerns that arise in connection with least developed member 
countries:  “[r]ecognizing also the special needs of the least-developed 
country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to 
 
68. Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO:  An Evolving 
Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 63 (2000). 
69. Petersmann, supra note 54, at 26.  For additional references, see Marco Ricolfi, The 
Interface Between Intellectual Property and International Trade:  The TRIPs Agreement, 
ITALIAN INTELL. PROP. 29, 33 nn.9–12 (Jan. 2002). 
70. For references, see sources cited supra note 49. 
71. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 17, at 193. 
72. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, rec. 5. 
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create a sound and viable technological base.”73  Article 7 clearly states 
that “[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property” are 
means intended to achieve a number of goals.74  It should be underlined 
that such goals only in part coincide with the classical policy rationale 
for protecting IP, the grant of protection as an incentive for the 
provision of a public good.75  More specifically, it seems quite 
remarkable that the text of Article 7, while stressing that IP protection 
and enforcement “should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation,”76 does not stop there as one might have expected.  Rather 
the provision goes on to mention an additional purpose, “the transfer 
and dissemination of technology,”77 that appears from the wording of 
Article 7 to have the same cogency as the former one. 
It could be argued that we should not read too much in the reference 
to “the transfer and dissemination of technology.”  After all, the more 
sophisticated analysis of IP has shown quite a long time ago that IP is 
concerned not just with incentives to the provision of innovation but 
also with incentives to its dissemination.  This is what Arrow’s 
Disclosure Paradox is all about.78  Except that, given the historical 
background, one might read in the dual reference to “transfer and 
dissemination,” which occurs both in Article 7 and in Article 40(1) in 
exactly the same words, some kind of acknowledgement of the dual 
claims of current users of technology-incorporating goods and future 
innovators. 
I submit that this reading is not so far-fetched as it appears at first 
sight.  And my argument builds on the final part of the wording of 
Article 7.  Indeed, it should be considered that this provision, after 
mentioning the purposes of IP protection I just discussed, goes on and 
refers to nothing less than “the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of  technological knowledge” and expresses a clear option in favor of IP 
protection modes shaped “in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”79 
This is really a gradual—and “grand”—opening of perspectives.  
One is reminded of a traveling along a route on the bottom of the valley 
 
73. Id. rec. 6. 
74. Id. art. 7. 
75. See Arrow, supra note 5. 
76. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7. 
77. Id. 
78. See Arrow, supra note 5, at 615. 
79. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
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when the progress of the road keeps disclosing a number of lateral 
views.  Intellectual property is the means because it serves two 
immediate purposes:  incentive for the provision of a public good and 
for its transfer and dissemination.  But there is more to it, because even 
these purposes are not ends by themselves but should serve additional, 
broader societal aims.  Several of these broader aims are specifically 
mentioned in Article 8(1).  Among these, competitive concerns, 
including the claims of current users and future innovators, should not 
be disregarded if the mandate of Articles 7 and 8(2) is to be taken 
seriously. 
3.  Taking the General Principles Seriously 
But then, should we really take the TRIPs’ general principles 
seriously?  This is a serious question, not a rhetorical one, because we 
may suspect that some portions of TRIPs may amount to nothing more 
than “window dressing.”  This suspicion, which usually crops up when a 
“development component” is superimposed on international trade 
compacts,80 might be examined by asking what the reference to “social” 
welfare adds to the usual economic characterization of welfare itself, 
which, as it is now commonly recognized, encompasses distributional 
and fairness concerns on top of allocative and productive efficiency 
goals.  Also, the reference to a balance of rights and obligations may 
seem as vague as it is broad. 
However, these broader societal concerns seem in fact to have been 
given appropriate consideration by the international community on a 
number of occasions.  Non-IP interests, particularly of users, were taken 
into account in the August 2003 deliberation, leading to the WTO 
decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.81  And one may well 
discern that efforts currently under way to make the patent system 
mutually supportive with the objective of preserving and fostering 
 
80. As exemplified by the thoughtful remarks by Simon J. Evenett, Systemic Research 
Questions Raised by the Failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, 31 LEGAL ISSUES 
OF ECON. INTEGRATION 1, 5 (2004) (noting that some argue that the “Doha Ministerial 
Meeting is unimportant windowdressing”). 
81. See generally Gionathan Curci & Massimo Vittori, Improving Access to Life-Saving 
Patented Drugs:  Between Compulsory Licensing and Differential Pricing, 7 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 739 (2004); M. Rafiqul Islam, The Generic Drug Deal of the WTO from Doha 
to Cancún:  A Peripheral Response to a Perennial Conundrum, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
675 (2004); Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health:  A Solution to the Access to Essential 
Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73 (2004). 
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biodiversity82 can be better visualized under the heading of “social 
welfare,” because this notion implies a respect for the autonomy of the 
(also non-IP) values of indigenous communities that may well defy the 
flatness of the calculus felicificus at which economists are so adept.  So, 
arguably the characterization of IP as a means to achieve a variety of 
goals under Article 7, including concerns about access by current users 
and future innovators, does have some meaning after all. 
Of course, one could say that there is an altogether different reason 
why TRIPs visualizes IP as a means rather than as an end.  As it has 
been quite rightly remarked,83 TRIPs is not an exercise in harmonization 
of intellectual property.  Harmonization and uniformation is what the 
European Union does; but then, the European Union is about building 
shared legal institutions within an economic and political union.  The 
overall purpose of WTO and TRIPs is altogether different and precisely 
consists of the minimization of trade barriers, including those arising out 
of divergence in IP.  Therefore, IP protection and enforcement are seen 
as means rather than ends in themselves.  This seems quite true to me; 
except that, in my opinion, this is only a part of the story.  A closer 
reading of TRIPs, as confirmed by subsequent behavior of Members 
and international institutions of the kind I just mentioned, shows that IP 
protection and enforcement are seen as means rather than ends in 
themselves both because the larger ends encompass freedom of trade—
there is no way to deny this—and because the international community 
is committed to taking into account other non-trade and non-IP factors 
while shaping IP protection. 
It would seem to me that pro-competitive concerns, including access 
by “users of technological knowledge” under Article 7 such as current 
users and future innovators, rank pretty high in the list of these other 
purposes that are declared relevant by TRIPs principles.  One could 
even go so far as to argue that this conclusion is a necessary implication 
of the very architecture of TRIPs, which considers competition law at 
the intersection with IP as its own subject matter.84  Therefore, recitals 5 
and 6 and Articles 7 and 8 should be taken seriously. 
 
82. In this connection, one cannot be but impressed by the declarations of the then 
E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights—Ten Years Later, 38 J. WORLD TRADE LAW 923, 928 (2004) (noting the reasons 
supporting the incorporation of “a requirement into the TRIPs Agreement that patent 
applicants should disclose the geographical source origin of the genetic material and the 
related traditional knowledge used in an invention”). 
83. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 408, 414. 
84. See supra Part I.A.3 
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Maybe what I am saying has a distinctively European ring to it.  The 
European Union, in IP matters as well as in a number of other areas, 
seems to be moving back and forth between self-serving and short-term 
motives, such as the creation of overprotective and protectionist regimes 
concerning database and design protection and occasional attempts to 
place itself on the moral high-ground.  Maybe this latter attitude is the 
basis of the positions of some high-ranking E.U. officials, such as the 
former E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy who when commenting 
on the first decade of TRIPs insisted on views similar to the ones I 
expressed here about TRIPs principles.85  Intellectual property rights are 
just “tools.”86  The ultimate ends are public health, access to nutrition, 
development, and access to knowledge—even more broadly, public 
interest and human rights.87  We cannot value the (private) means higher 
than the (public) ends.88  The shrinking of the public domain poses a 
threat to new creations and innovation.  This difficulty should be 
addressed by harnessing the flexibilities built within TRIPs.89  Reading 
these statements, I am rather encouraged.  However, I would have much 
preferred to hear them when Mr. Lamy was at the beginning of his term 
as E.U. Trade Commissioner rather than at the end when he had 
become a candidate for the position of WTO Secretary.  I should also 
confess that at the same I time feel quite apologetic when I pause to 
think about the disingenuous moves that the European Union from time 
to time makes in connection with agriculture and textiles while 
enunciating these lofty ideals.  I know there is a contradiction here; but, 
I also believe that there is no reason to throw the baby away with the 
bath water. 
4.  Implementing the General Principles:  Antitrust, Development 
Component and Regime Design Fine-Tuning 
It should be noted, going back to the questions I raised at the 
beginning of this Part, that the general principles must be taken 
seriously simply because they incorporate what is referred to as a 
“development component” in connection with measures specifically 
targeting international transfer of technology.  While this may be an 
important issue, particularly for developing countries, the goal of 
 
85. Lamy, supra note 82, at 925. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 925–26, 932. 
88. Id. at 925. 
89. Id. at 928–29. 
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preserving access to technological knowledge by subsequent generations 
of innovators has more to it than the distributional and fairness 
concerns we generally associate with reference to a “development 
component” of international trade agreements; indeed, it is about the 
global economy and its long-term efficiency. 
It would seem that the reading I just proposed here of TRIPs 
general principles allows for ample room to rules aiming to preserve 
competitive openness in downstream innovation markets.  Indeed, as we 
just noted, Article 7 of TRIPs advocates as its ultimate goal:  “the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of a technological knowledge.”  
It is to be expected that, on top of the consideration due to the interests 
of producers of current technology, the interests of those users of the 
same current technology, who in turn are candidates to become IP 
producers by generating and making available the next generations of 
technologies, are given appropriate weight.  In this connection, it should 
be taken into account that these latter interests, while occasionally 
conflicting with those of incumbent IP holders, can hardly be described 
as non-IP and may prove essential under the current circumstances to 
keep the innovation engine working.  Because IP protection is not a 
goal in itself, but a means intended to contribute to the provision and 
dissemination of technological innovation, the “manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare” recommended by Article 7 would seem to 
require a fine balancing between claims to protection by current, 
“incumbent” IP holders and claims to access to innovation markets by 
subsequent, “new-comer” generations of IP providers. 
So far we have been dealing with goals.  Turning our attention to 
means, or rather to the issue of the choice of means adequate to further 
the relevant goals, we should note that a crucial question in this 
connection is whether TRIPs enables the pursuit of these purposes not 
only through ad hoc and ex post antitrust intervention but also through 
generalized and ex ante measures.  These measures include the option 
to design the various features of intellectual property rights, such as the 
access requirement, the scope of protection, or the limitations and 
exceptions, in such a way to permanently incorporate pro-competitive 
features. 
To counter this latter possibility, it might be argued that TRIPs 
makes room only for antitrust intervention.  Any kind of measure not 
specifically intended to prevent a restraint of competition, it might be 
argued, is not TRIPs-compliant.  This argument is clearly wrong.  Under 
Article 8(2), Members may also adopt legislation “to prevent the abuse 
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
RICOLFI - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:30:13 PM 
2006] AN ANTITRUST ANTIDOTE WITHIN TRIPS? 329 
 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology”90 even in the absence of proof of a specific 
restriction of competition.  Indeed, as earlier remarked,91 resorting to 
the disjunctive “or” in this provision clarifies that adverse impact on 
international transfer of technology may be a sufficient basis for 
legislation controlling IP abuse or dealings.92  So, the same issue that 
gave rise to endless discussions when model laws were drafted with a 
view to implementing the U.N. Set93 has been solved by a simple stroke 
of the pen in the TRIPs context. 
I submit that TRIPs’ general principles, as understood here, provide 
a number of ways of advancing competitive concerns including the 
possibility of incorporating pro-competitive features in the design of IP 
rights.  Generalized ex ante measures to advance pro-competitive 
concerns in the design of specific IP regimes can clearly be encompassed 
by the literal meaning of Article 8(2).  Under certain conditions, the 
balancing of competing claims by current IP holders and downstream 
innovators favored by TRIPs general principles is best achieved by fine-
tuning IP regime design rather than by antitrust intervention.  Indeed, 
the former may turn out to be more predictable in its outcome, because 
it can be adopted ex ante rather than ex post by interested parties.  It 
may also entail a much greater level of legal certainty at the time the 
initial decision as to investment in innovation is taken than is the case 
with antitrust proceedings, in which the initiation of a controversy and 
its ultimate results are to a very large extent unforeseeable.  
Additionally, it should be considered that regime design fine-tuning 
would have the advantage of being generalized rather than ad hoc, 
translating into rules evenly applicable to all firms and business entities 
that might find themselves in a set of in pre-defined circumstances.  This 
feature again compares well with antitrust intervention in terms of 
TRIPs’ general principles because it would avoid the recurrent, 
unfortunate situation whereby a firm subject to antitrust scrutiny is apt 
to be singled out in ways that may entail the dangers of discriminatory 
treatment.  This risk is not to be lightly dismissed in contexts, as the one 
considered here, in which antitrust is based on regional or national rules 
applicable to both national and foreign firms and its enforcement, as we 
 
90. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
91. See supra Part I.A. 
92. A similar point is made by Ullrich.  Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406; see also Odman, 
supra note 11, at 348–49. 
93. See SELL, supra note 17, at 166–69. 
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shall see in more detail later, may turn out to be inappropriately 
“selective.” 
Of course, the kind of modification or adaptation of regime design I 
described as fine-tuning should not subvert the basic features of the 
relevant IP protection.  Indeed, fine-tuning should be confined to minor, 
“interstitial” adaptation of features, such as access requirement, scope 
of protection, exceptions, initial ownership rules or transferability, 
which make for a finer balancing of the interests at issue without 
contradicting the basic premises of TRIPs-mandated minimum 
protection.  In this regard, the concept of fine-tuning seems to me the 
reverse side of the notion of “net outcome,” which I earlier described as 
TRIPs-mandated and non-negotiable.94  Minimum standards are not a 
mandate for absolute uniformity in all Members’ IP laws, because total 
uniformation in IP protection certainly is not the goal of TRIPs.  Rather 
the core of protection as envisaged by TRIPs should not be curtailed.  It 
is interesting to note that a recent World Trade Organization Panel 
Report has similarly argued that the good faith principle guiding 
Members in the exercise of their discretion is enshrined in the “a 
balance of rights and obligations”95 language in Article 7. 
While the option I described as regime design fine-tuning has these 
obvious advantages, it has its limitations as well.  To begin with, this 
alternative is open only if and to the extent the mandate of TRIPs-
compatibility is respected.96  To make sure that this is the case, a number 
of criteria has to be developed.  I shall try to work out the details in Part 
III.  Nevertheless, coming back to the issue I raised in the final part of 
Part I.A.4, it already appears possible at the present stage of the 
discussion to build on the reading of TRIPs principles here proposed to 
come to the conclusion that, in deciding whether TRIPs-mandated 
uniform standards are compromised or not, the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions should indeed give an appropriate place to TRIPs 
general principles.  In doing so, it is possible to reserve adequate 
consideration both to the pro-competitive concerns these incorporate 
and to the claims to access to IP from current users and subsequent 
generations of innovators as recognized under Article 7 of TRIPs. 
 
94. See supra Part I.A.4. 
95. See Section 211 Panel Report, supra note 59, ¶ 8.57. 
96. See supra Part I.A.4. 
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5.  The Constitutional Dimension of TRIPs:  From Negative to Positive 
Integration 
As remarked earlier,97 TRIPs departs from the long tradition 
whereby international IP conventions confined themselves to imposing 
on Members only negative obligations, in particular by requiring 
national treatment of foreigners, and takes the unprecedented step of 
mandating positive obligations, including most-favored nation treatment 
and greatly expanding minimum IP protection standards.98  What are the 
implications of this new approach for the purpose of determining to 
what extent TRIPs authorizes IP-interfacing competition rules to 
consider non-IP interests, including claims to access by current users 
and future innovators? 
One can look at this issue in two ways.  By importing a constitutional 
dimension into international public law, one may make the case that the 
more extensive and intensive involvement of the international 
community in shaping uniform IP rules, which hitherto had remained in 
the preserve of domestic regulators, should be counterbalanced by an 
expansive reading of the legislative powers retained by Members.  It 
may be also argued that this reading should, in particular, apply at the 
intersection between IP and competition for reasons that appear well-
grounded on the reading of TRIPs’ general principles proposed here.  
Reference to the neo-federalistic underpinnings of TRIPs99 might well 
describe this former approach. 
A more complex argument has been developed by international law 
scholars.100  According to this latter view, the move from negative to 
positive integration of Members of the international community is not 
confined to IP and TRIPs.  Indeed, the same expansion has taken place 
at the macro level.  While 1949 GATT was based on negative 
integration in the form of a ban on discrimination of foreign goods, the 
1994 WTO-GATT architecture is based on positive integration.  Indeed, 
in addition to export trade, it also encompasses licensing of IP and 
foreign direct investment, which is made apparent by the inclusion of 
 
97. See supra Part I.A. 
98. Originally, the only uniform minimum standards of protection to be found in 
international IP conventions were the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 10bis, U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention] (as last at Stockholm July 14, 1967), and the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, arts. 2(5), 5, 6bis, 11bis, 25 U.S.T. 
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971). 
99. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 447. 
100. See Petersmann, supra note 54, at 29, 33–40. 
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the GATS and TRIPs components in WTO’s single package.  In this 
perspective, the most-favored nation clause and uniform minimum 
standards feature of TRIPs are still of paramount importance as a 
corollary of the larger shift rather than for their specific significance.  It 
is forcefully argued that positive integration cannot remain confined to 
markets, as the experience of E.U. integration has shown.  Rather, it 
triggers broader claims of political legitimacy that find a reply only on 
the basis of a fundamental rights dimension.  Competition rules, along 
with the formation of a “broader political constituency”101 and the 
establishment of appropriate mechanisms for upholding fundamental 
human rights, are deemed to be the locus in which such broader claims 
may find their proper basis. 
While I have been a keen reader of Professor Petersmann’s work in 
the last decades, I must also confess that I am not always sure that I am 
able to make out exactly what he means.  This is certainly due to my 
limitations.  As an IP and corporate lawyer, I certainly am not best 
situated to grasp all the niceties and implications of international public 
law scholarship.  However, I will propose here a minimalist reading of 
his argument.  Petersmann’s work certainly does make a case for (a) 
giving an appropriate place to the pro-competitive concerns 
incorporated in TRIPs, such as the international constitutional 
dimension at which the WTO compact places freedom of markets and 
firms engaged in the market process has a constitutive (or is it 
constitutional?) significance; and for (b) recognizing that WTO framers 
thought that the best level in which this significance should be preserved 
is, under the current institutional arrangements and as far as the IP-
competition intersection is concerned, the domestic level of Members’ 
municipal legislation. 
Also, scholarship is a cumulative enterprise; thus, I expect that 
further consideration, particularly by a younger generation of scholars, 
may lead to the distillation of more clear and precise insights in this 
admittedly obscure—and may be a bit “Hegelian”—corner of this 
Article. 
 
101. Id. at 26. 
RICOLFI - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:30:13 PM 
2006] AN ANTITRUST ANTIDOTE WITHIN TRIPS? 333 
 
II.  MEMBERS’ OPTIONS 
A.  The Menu of TRIPs-Compliant Pro-Competitive Models 
1.  An Interim Balance 
Even if one accepts the interpretive framework just proposed, what 
sort of pro-competitive inputs fit the TRIPs architecture?  The question 
should be asked, because after so much talk about ends and means, 
intermediate goals and final goals, and of constitutional dimensions and 
federalistic underpinnings, one might start to wonder where promotion 
of competition exactly belongs. 
By now, we should be in a position to sketch a tentative reply to this 
question by combining a few of the earlier findings. 
First, we established that in this area TRIPs builds on an 
architecture based on authorization plus reticence.102  Therefore, 
Members should be deemed to enjoy considerable latitude in shaping 
their laws at the intersection between IP and antitrust.  Such latitude fits 
nicely into the larger picture.103 
Second, Members’ legislation authorized by TRIPs may no doubt be 
intended to foster competition for the sake of competition itself under 
classic antitrust laws, that is, to make sure that markets are kept open 
and that decentralized price-based market mechanisms may contribute 
to allocative and productive efficiency.  However, TRIPs does not seem 
to mandate that IP-interfacing competition rules envisage competitive 
outcomes as their exclusive or main goal.  On the contrary, it would 
appear that Members may enact IP-interfacing competition rules while 
keeping in mind other concurrent concerns, including the purpose of 
curbing practices that may have a negative impact on transfer of 
technology under Articles 7, 8(2), and 40 or restrict access by users and 
subsequent generations of innovators again under Articles 7 and 8.104 
Third, I have argued that the reading of the TRIPs’ general 
principles opens up the possibility of incorporating pro-competitive 
concerns and giving adequate consideration to claims for access to IP by 
current users and subsequent generations of innovators.  Members may 
do so by resorting to a variety of measures, including generalized ex 
 
102. See supra Part I.A.3. 
103. See supra Part I.B.3–4. 
104. See supra  Part I.B.2–4. 
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ante rules in the very design of individual IP rights.105  I recognize that 
this last point still needs being fleshed-out because I have not yet tried 
to develop detailed criteria to deal with the overriding mandate of 
TRIPs-compliance.  Nevertheless, it appears to me that the best way to 
go about in this kind of task is to look at the specifics of individual 
issues, as I propose to do shortly in Part III. 
By combining these findings, we should now be in a position to 
perceive the width of the spectrum of choices enabled by TRIPs to 
Members in connection with the shaping of their laws at the intersection 
of IP and competition. 
2.  Varieties of Antitrust:  The Benefits of Hindsight 
How wide is the spectrum of available choices?  In replying to this 
question, we should start with classic antitrust or competition rules that 
probably provide a lesson from our own past.  Indeed, in the U.S. and 
E.U. antitrust community in the last two or three decades, there has 
been a certain amount of convergence on the issue of the purposes of 
antitrust.  On the two sides of the Atlantic, we seem to generally agree 
that the dual goals of antitrust are allocative and productive efficiency.  
They both put market mechanisms to the ultimate advantage of 
consumers, and antitrust, being a remedy to market failure, protects 
competition rather than competitors. 
However, if this is our current position, things have been quite 
different in the past.  I do not want to go into all the various strands that 
have from time to time found their place in the complex and fascinating 
history of antitrust.  What seems certain to me is that, at earlier times, 
both American and European antitrust laws have been concerned about 
the possibility that powerful combinations might, in the words of Justice 
Peckham, drive “out of business small dealers and worthy men, whose 
lives have been spent therein.”106  On other occasions, and notably at the 
time of the passage of the Sherman Act107 and the introduction of 
antitrust laws in post-World War II Germany,108 it has been the political 
legitimacy of monopolistic power that has been questioned as 
incompatible with our democratic forms of government. 
 
105. See supra Part I.B.4. 
106. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). 
107. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1219 (1988), reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT:  THE FIRST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS 85, 110–12 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991). 
108. See Gerd Winter, Sozialisierung in Hessen 1946–1955, in KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 157 
(1974). 
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Moreover, fairness concerns have been recurrently incorporated into 
antitrust assessments.  This is precisely what happened on the American 
side of the Atlantic when the goal of preserving the Jeffersonian ideal of 
a sufficient number of (possibly small and local) competitors on the 
market (notably against the risk of their “foreclosure”) has prevailed.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, we Europeans have resorted to a 
similar overstretching of competition laws to accommodate the eirenic 
vision of a social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) with a 
strong component of small and medium enterprises (Mittelstandschutz), 
as advocated by the economist Chancellor Ludwig Erhard at the time of 
Germany’s post-war economic boom. 
Of course, we currently tend to regard these approaches as weak 
minded, even if noble.  However, the best of us109 have been able to 
visualize that these very incomplete understandings have proved to be 
necessary steps in the process that lead us to the present consensus, and 
that what might appear with today’s lenses as an inconsistency or a 
weakness did at the time play an important, if transitory role, in the 
overall arrangement of legal affairs. 
Therefore, it seems to me quite possible that features similar to the 
ones we have in the meantime dismissed as unsatisfactory or even 
unacceptable might initially crop-up in a number of TRIPs-enabled 
competition laws.  A practice that we, at this stage of our competition 
laws, might regard as perfectly acceptable and even efficient, such as a 
tie-in by a firm without market power, might well be considered unfair 
or restrictive and, therefore, forbidden by emerging countries’ 
legislation.  Harm to a weak competitor, which we might consider of no 
material impact on competition or even the healthy expulsion from 
market of the inefficient, may still be seen as objectionable.  Scrutiny 
over the “fairness” of the terms set by a dominant firm may appear 
appropriate.  These rules may appear wrong-headed to us; and they 
probably are wrong.  We should, however, make good use of the 
benefits of hindsight.  Therefore, we should remember that they 
occasionally have served useful purposes at the time we, on both sides 
of the Atlantic, adopted them or their equivalents. 
More to the point, I believe that there is no legal objection under 
TRIPs to these measures, which after all belong to the panoply of 
instruments we have for a long time used under the heading of antitrust 
 
109. Among whom I would like to include an Italian scholar, VINCENZO MELI, 
RIFIUTO DI CONTRARRE E TUTELA DELLA CONCORRENZA NEL DIRITTO ANTITRUST 
COMUNITARIO (2003). 
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or competition law, “provided”—of course—“that they are consistent 
with the [other] provisions of this Agreement”110 (which is a remarkable 
restriction anyway, as we had a chance to see in the previous Part).  This 
conclusion seems to me even more warranted if we consider that, as just 
indicated, Article 8(2) of TRIPs goes so far as to allow for legislation 
intended “to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which . . . adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology,”111 even in absence of proof of a 
restriction of competition. 
Surely, it is quite possible that some of the measures considered 
TRIPs-compliant may eventually backfire on the economies of the 
Members that adopt them.  Indeed, licensing by Northern firms to 
Southern businesses may end up being discouraged rather than 
promoted by overly restrictive legislation.  This simple rule applies 
across-the-board:  to exchange control and profit repatriation 
restrictions as well as to antitrust intervention aiming to forbid “unfair” 
contractual arrangements.  Just to mention an IP-specific situation, it 
has been often argued that outlawing clauses that prevent licensees from 
exporting licensed products either to the country of the licensor or to 
those of other licensees may in actual practice have an adverse impact 
on technology flows, thereby inducing a would-be licensor to give up the 
idea of licensing in the first place.112  However, the point I am making 
here is different.  The wisdom of this sort of legislative measures should 
be seen as an issue of policy; their ultimate economic outcome depends 
on a matrix of factors among which the size of the market of the country 
adopting the measure is probably a crucial one.113  I previously argued 
that technical cooperation under Article 67 of TRIPs extends to the 
preparation of laws and regulations on the prevention of abuse of 
intellectual property rights,114 including anti-competitive abuses.  I would 
also suggest that Members with antitrust expertise should give 
independent (and disinterested) advice to help developing and least-
 
110. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
111. Id. 
112. For a full treatment of this issue, see Talia Einhorn, The Impact of the WTO 
Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) on EC Law:  A 
Challenge to Regionalism, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1069 (1998). 
113. Data about the correlation of market size, IP protection, and decisions concerning 
the mode of exploitation of technology (exports of goods, licensing, foreign direct 
investment) is accumulating.  For a preliminary review, see Reichman & Maskus, 
Globalization, supra note 7, at 287–91. 
114. See supra Part I.A. 
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developed Members distinguish measures that are economically 
expedient under their specific domestic circumstances from those that 
are likely to backfire.  But this does not in any way amount to saying 
that inappropriate measures would thereby be ipso facto in breach of 
TRIPs. 
However, there are cases in which a measure adopted by a Member 
may be in breach of TRIPs.  And this is case, as we just saw, when they 
are not consistent with “the provisions of this Agreement” under 
Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 40(2).  Otherwise, Members do enjoy wide 
discretion in framing rules at the intersection between IP and 
competition. 
B.  Effectiveness Issues 
Will Members, in fact, make use of such a discretion?  This is a 
factual question that will find a satisfactory reply only through evidence 
of future actual practice.  However, I raise it here because it would 
appear to me that we are already in a position to make at least an 
educated guess as to the likelihood of future developments in this area. 
1.  Dissemination-Oriented Competition Rules and Developing 
Countries 
In this connection, I would not make too much of the fact that an 
ever-growing number of member countries have adopted rules that can 
be loosely described as competition, antimonopolistic or antitrust 
laws.115  This is to a large extent an irrelevancy, because a very large 
percentage of these laws has remained on the books only, actual 
implementation being either occasional or even non-existent.116 
What are the reasons for this kind of failure, which is particularly 
widespread among developing countries?  The fact is that emerging 
economies do have a number of reasons to be cautious in embracing 
antitrust.  Their political and academic elites tend to see antitrust as a 
body of rules originating from developed nations and hardly adaptable 
to their widely different economic and social environments, in which 
State intervention and action by public enterprises tends to be 
extensive.117  Indeed, the case has often been made that the most 
 
115. Monti, supra note 36, at 81 (reporting that in 2001, eighty WTO Members had 
enacted one form or other of antitrust laws). 
116. See Joel Klein, Expanding our Web of Bilateral Agreements, in COMPETITION 
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 335, 338–39. 
117. See AJIT SINGH & RAHUL DHUMALE, COMPETITION POLICY, DEVELOPMENT 
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appropriate timing for implementing competition policy should be 
selected on the basis of the stage of economic development in which 
each economy finds itself.118  In earlier phases of economic development, 
what is labeled as dynamic efficiency, may be perceived as more 
important than static efficiency.  Accordingly, the goal of keeping prices 
down and increasing consumers’ choice may be deemed to have a lower 
priority than investment and economic growth.119  It is argued that, if 
developing countries were to adopt antitrust, at a minimum they should 
incorporate “asymmetrical” rules in favor of what are usually called 
infant industries.120  In a similar vein, it is suggested—now not always 
quite as openly as in the past—that competition rules for developing 
countries should leave open the possibility for the kind of government 
intervention in the market place that, while disparagingly described by 
free-marketeers as industrial policy or mercantilism, has sometimes 
proved exceedingly successful, as evidenced by the high rate of 
economic growth of the countries usually described as Asian Tigers 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore).121 
Maybe we should examine the reasons that explain this attitude of 
caution, if not of suspicion,122 usually experienced by developing 
countries in connection with antitrust.  If we do this, we might perceive 
what lies at the heart of this quite widespread attitude.  Antitrust is 
liable to turn out to be a kind of Trojan horse of multinational 
enterprises, because the nets of local regulations and reciprocal 
 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 11–13 (Trade-Related Agenda, Dev., & Equity (TRADE), 
Working Paper No. 7, 1999), reprinted in WHAT GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS? 122, 132–34 
(Philip Arestis et al. eds., 2001). 
118. For this kind of argument, see Kerrin M. Vautier, Competition Policy, the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council and the WTO, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM:  THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 131, 143 (Ramesh Adhikari & 
Prema-chandra Athukorala eds., 2002). 
119. See SINGH & DHUMALE, supra note 117, at 133–34; see also Jenny, supra note 35, 
at 312 (discussing the issues that surfaced several times during the meetings held by the 
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy). 
120. For a sympathetic discussion of this argument, see Jenny, supra note 35, at 308–09. 
121. For a reference to the economic choices of Hong Kong and Singapore, see 
Vautier, supra note 118, 133–34.  For discussion specific to the desire of developing countries 
to retain flexibility in the setting up crisis and rationalization cartels, see Clifford A. Jones & 
Mitsuo Matsushita, Global Antitrust in the Millennium Round:  The Ways Forward, in 
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 397, 405–406. 
122. I think it is more accurate to refer to caution than suspiciousness or reluctance 
towards antitrust in this context, because in recent decades on a number of occasions 
developing countries seem to have shown interest and even entertained hopes in the 
possibilities of development-friendly uses of antitrust.  In this connection, and in a political 
sciences perspective, see SELL, supra note 17, at 175–216. 
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understandings between firms that knit together domestic businesses 
and helped them to keep afloat on the market risk to be challenged and 
ultimately displaced by strict enforcement of antitrust and its precepts of 
market access and parity of competitive conditions.  Indeed, it has been 
forcefully argued that what is described as a level playing field in actual 
practice is “tilted in favour of multinationals;” and this point, made by 
writers clearly engaged in favor of developing countries,123 is embraced 
also by much more detached scholars.124  Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that, among the many grounds of failure of the still recent 
Cancún summit, we should find a total refusal by developing countries 
to include in the agenda the issue of international antitrust.125 
However, it should be noted that none of the reasons of caution, 
reluctance or resistance towards antitrust enforcement apply when 
considering the specific field that is located at the intersection between 
IP and competition.  This is so for a very simple reason:  the promotion 
of competition leads to a one-way street.  In fact, IP assets typically 
belong to holders who are not nationals of developing countries, as 
evidenced by all available statistics and confirmed by the history of 
TRIPs negotiations I earlier referred to above.  Therefore, adopting 
competition rules at the intersection with IP, possibly in combination 
with measures specifically targeting restrictions in international 
transfers of technology, seems to be apt to bring to developing 
countries’ economies many of the predictable benefits associated with 
competition policies without incurring most of the perceived risks. 
Coming back to the question that opened this Part, the reply seems 
to be in the affirmative, at least in part.  It seems likely that a number of 
Members, including developing member countries, will indeed have 
incentives to make use of the discretion accorded to them by TRIPs at 
the intersection of IP and antitrust.  This seems even more likely, 
considering the number of available choices.  When the menu is ample 
and varied,126 it becomes easier to find an option that is perceived as 
palatable.  And it seems that this forecast can be corroborated by 
pointing to the writings of a younger generation of developing countries’ 
scholars that are advocating a well-tempered use of competition law at 
the intersection with IP and preparing a number of carefully calibrated 
 
123. SINGH & DHUMALE, supra note 117, at 128. 
124. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 17, at 187. 
125. See Stewart, supra note 48. 
126. See supra Part II.A.2. 
RICOLFI - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:30:13 PM 
340 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2 
 
recommendations for their policymakers precisely in this field.127 
 
2.  Innovation-Oriented Competition Rules in Global Innovation 
Markets 
There is a second, separate reason for questioning whether pro-
competitive inputs may have a real impact over the current trends in IP.  
The argument has been raised in connection with cutting-edge, high-
innovation technologies, rather than with developing countries as in the 
previous paragraph.  In this context, it has been noted that TRIPs-
enabled competition rules, even if they were to be enacted and 
enforced, may at a maximum play a limited role in counteracting IP 
overprotection, because they follow a model of competition policy that 
has in the meantime become obsolete.128  This is so, it is argued, because 
classic antitrust deals with products’ markets and with post-innovation 
technology transfers from advanced to less-advanced industries and 
firms;129 however, these areas have become marginal as the main focus of 
IP protection has shifted from “tangible material embodiments”130—
such as mechanical devices, chemical and pharmaceutical products—to 
new varieties of subject matter “in their disembodied state” (such as 
software and DNA code).131  While dissemination-oriented competition 
law has gradually becomes less relevant, tangible product markets 
recede, and innovation markets become crucial, the new innovation-
oriented competition policy that has emerged in the United States and 
in the European Union is perceived as increasingly unequal to the 
original antitrust mission of preserving open and competitive markets.  
More recent competition laws, when dealing with novel forms of 
disembodied subject matter, are seen as engaging in a race of laxitude, 
in which the dominant criterion becomes the measurement of some 
notion of innovation efficiency rather than of the restrictive impact of 
 
127. See Odman, supra note 11; see also Stewart, supra note 48.  For additional 
references, see Pacón, supra note 49, at 348–56.  However, it appears noteworthy that the 
younger generation of developing countries’ scholars also include voices, such as Ignacio De 
Leon, The Dilemma of Regulating International Competition under the WTO System, 18 
ECLR 162 (1997) (presenting a closely argued case against the soundness of the theoretical 
basis of antitrust by reopening the controversy—which seemed closed half a century ago—on 
the very justiciability of this area of law). 
128. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 421.  For a similar analysis, see supra text 
accompanying notes 7–8. 
129. Ullrich, supra note 8, at 420. 
130. See id. at 416. 
131. See id. 
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current arrangements.132 
Once again, I am neither totally sure that I fully understand all of 
this nor that I totally agree with what I understand.  So, I believe that I 
have already stated clearly enough the reasons why I do not see TRIPs-
enabled competition rules as mainly focusing on two-party licensing, 
even though I can see the danger to new-comer Members in the field of 
antitrust.  For instance, developing countries might end up giving too 
much weight to issues that may have become less crucial, such as the 
control of clauses perceived as restrictive in technology transfer and 
licensing.133 
Also, I agree that, by moving upstream IP protection, developed 
countries, particularly the United States and the European Union, may 
have made it more difficult to preserve the delicate balance between 
incentives to innovation and competitive openness.  This trend may 
threaten both the long-term efficiency of the global economy and, in 
part, the chances of those developing countries that strive, sometimes 
with remarkable success, to stay at the cutting-edge of innovation.  
Indeed, it is the perception of precisely these developments that has 
supplied the starting point of this Article. 
However, it also seems that this challenge may be met in TRIPs-
compliant ways both by developed and developing Members on the 
basis of the prior findings.  In general terms, TRIPs allows for a wide 
menu of pro-competitive options.  More specifically, these include a 
spectrum of options consisting not only of traditional ex post antitrust 
intervention and measures specifically targeting international transfer of 
technology, but also of the kind of ex ante pro-competitive features in 
the design of individual IP rights that this Article earlier described as 
regime fine-tuning.  The emergence of this novel form of norm-making 
at the intersection of IP and competition should hardly be surprising if it 
is true that novel challenges tend to generate fresh opportunities. 
III.  TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS:  FIVE EASY PIECES 
It is sometimes said that the proof of the pudding is in the eating.  
So, it may be advisable at this juncture to turn to the analysis of a few 
specific examples of areas in which IP protection and competitive 
concerns meet to identify with the necessary precision the options 
 
132. See id. at 421–26.  There are E.U. group innovation incentives in areas such as 
pooling, cross-licensing, joint research and development, which parallel similar developments 
in the United States.  See id. at 418–20. 
133. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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available to Members and to assess their TRIPs-compatibility.  As to the 
sequence, this Article will initially look at measures specifically 
targeting restrictions in the international transfer of technology, then 
the classical antitrust intervention, and finally the kind of generalized ex 
ante measures described above as regime design fine-tuning. 
A.  Measures Specifically Targeting Restrictive Behavior in International 
Transfer of Technology 
1.  Ex post Intervention in International Technology Transfer 
We may as well start with an easy one.  As earlier indicated, there is 
no doubt that Members may adopt appropriate measures to control or 
forbid licensing practices or unilateral behavior concerning IP that may 
adversely affect international trade under Articles 8(2) and 40(2) of 
TRIPs.  It is also without question that such measures, whether 
concerning bilateral or unilateral behavior, may be adopted even in the 
absence of proof that they involve a specific restriction of competition, 
such as would be required under classical antitrust rules.  Therefore, to 
establish TRIPs-compatibility of a given provision, it is not required134 
that the behavior subject to control or prohibition is prejudicial to 
competition at large rather than to a specific competitor.135  This is not 
so simply because, as we established above,136 TRIPs leaves room to a 
wide spectrum of varieties of antitrust.  Rather a threshold 
consideration is controlling here:  establishing the anti-competitive 
character of the controlled or forbidden behavior is not a requirement 
under Article 8(2). 
However, it has been persuasively argued that the competition-
restrictive nature of a technology transfer clause or agreement is a 
necessary connecting factor under Article 40(2), even though it is not a 
factor determining the outcome of the control.137  This is most probably 
so; however, it does not seem to rebut the point previously made.  
Indeed, as noted above in Part I.A.1, Article 8(2) covers both unilateral 
and bilateral behavior because it refers to the notion of “practices.”  
 
134. As was probably the case in connection with model laws under the U.N. Set.  See 
SELL, supra note 17, 164–68. 
135. An example of the latter might be a clause requiring a licensee to purchase 
quality-sensitive inputs exclusively from a licensor not possessing market power.  An example 
of the former would be a clause or practice (e.g., a ban on competition in research and 
development) undermining licensee’s technological independence. 
136. See supra Part II.A.2. 
137. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 406 n.21. 
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Thus, a provision that may fail to be TRIPs-compliant under Article 
40(2)—because it lacks the required connecting factor—is still apt to be 
found legitimate under Article 8(2). 
In this connection, it should be noted that so far we have been 
talking about Members’ provisions that forbid or control behavior by 
private parties.  The corresponding rules are negative, in that they tell 
private parties what they are not supposed to do.  Should the same 
private parties fail to comply with the rule, the Member’s legal system 
may ex post react on the basis of an ad hoc judicial or administrative 
decision, the effects of which are limited to that specific situation. 
2.  Local Working Requirements 
Now, we should look at the question of whether Members are 
permitted under TRIPs to structure their patent laws in such a way as to 
insert a requirement of local working.  If so, the holder of a patent 
granted by the Member’s legal system has what prima facie would 
appear as an affirmative duty to exploit the patent in the country of the 
grant pursuant to the provision of Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention 
and is subject to compulsory licensing under Article 5(A)(2) and (4) 
thereof in the event he or she fails to work it for a given number of 
consecutive years from the date of the filing or the grant. 
This issue is understandably hotly debated.138  If failure to work were 
to trigger liability to compulsory licensing, the corresponding provision 
would translate into a powerful incentive for patent holders to engage in 
local working, rather than in manufacturing elsewhere and importing.  
In turn, this would encourage patentees to transfer technology from 
those more advanced economies in which they are likely to be 
headquartered to the country imposing the requirement.  Such a rule 
would accordingly not only be perceived as making a significant 
contribution towards the technological development of the Member of 
the grant but also as providing a formidable means of coercion over 
patentees. 
 It might be argued that the rule would be covered, as to its 
TRIPs-compliance, by both sections of Article 8.  Article 8(1) provides 
 
138. See Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT, 28 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383, 408 (1991); Correa, supra note 66, at 490; Gustavo Ghidini, 
“Equitable sharing” of Benefits of Biodiversity-Based Innovation:  Some Reflections Under the 
Shadow of a Neem-Tree, ITALIAN INTELL. PROP. 39, 45–46 (2002); Pacón, supra note 49, at 
340; Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM 
GATT TO TRIPS:  THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 160, 204–05. 
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in part that “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary . . . to promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided such measures are consistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement.”139  Thus, it may be argued that local working may be 
mandated by Members at least in “sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development.”  In turn, Article 8(2) 
provides that “appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent . . . the 
resort to practices which . . . adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology.”140  This latter provision might be read as justifying local 
working requirements across-the-board, particularly if we subscribe to 
the view that, under the notion of “practices which . . . adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology,” we can understand not only 
unilateral or bilateral behavior by patent holders vis-à-vis actual or 
potential business partners, as we have assumed so far, but also a purely 
unilateral behavior, such as manufacturing abroad and importing into 
the Member. 
 This approach might be supported by reference to the provision 
of Article 5A of the Paris Convention, because paragraph 2 of this 
provision, which was incorporated by reference in TRIPs through 
Article 2(1), considers “failure to work” a patent as a mode of exercise 
of the right that may be deemed abusive and, thus, subject to the 
remedy of compulsory licensing.141 
 On the other hand, this conclusion may be challenged by 
referring to the text of Article 27(1) of TRIPs, which quite adamantly 
states that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced.”142  This contrary argument is 
supported quite strongly by current principles of purposive 
interpretation.  The WTO/GATT international economic context is 
clearly based on the idea that the free flow of factors should be 
liberalized so that the law of comparative advantages may foster the 
optimal allocation of resources.  Thus, it is very difficult to conceive that 
Members’ legislation may still consider abusive decisions as to the 
 
139. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 8(1). 
140. Id. art. 8(2). 
141. See Correa, supra note 66, at 490.  The opposite view is advanced by Straus, supra 
note 138, at 204–05. 
142. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (emphasis added). 
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location in which patented goods are to be manufactured, because this 
kind of choice should be in principle left to the decentralized decisions 
of economic actors and sheltered from regulatory coercion.143  Thus, it 
does not seem to me that it could plausibly be argued that Article 27(1) 
of TRIPs constitutes the lex generalis on patentable subject matter, 
while Article 5A of Paris Convention contains the lex specialis on the 
issue of local working.  Indeed, if Article 5A still were understood as 
implying that import of patented goods manufactured abroad is not 
perfectly equivalent to local manufacture of the same goods, the 
municipal legislation enacted under the old Paris Convention provision 
would run counter the prohibition of “other measures” apt to restrict 
the free flow of trade contained in Article XI of GATT.144 
 Therefore, it appears that the mandate of TRIPs-consistency does 
not allow that the rule of Article 27(1) regarding the equivalence of 
imports to local manufacturing to be undermined by an across-the-
board compulsory licensing regime triggered by failure to locally work 
the patent.  Neither Article 8(2) nor Article 31 of TRIPs could possibly 
justify such a result, which would amount to a total negation of the 
principle of equivalence.  This outcome is corroborated even if we 
consider TRIPs general principles:  the development component can be 
brought in to complement and fine-tune core IP protection, but not to 
subvert it altogether.145 
 On an earlier occasion, I have suggested that more specific and 
limited measures might still be warranted under Article 8(1).146  By 
reading this latter provision in the light of the general principles-based 
authorization to take into account the development component in IP 
matters and particularly in the light of TRIPs recitals 5 and 6, it might 
be possible to argue that Member legislation providing for compulsory 
licensing in specific sectors, such as biotechnology, may be TRIPs-
compatible.  More specifically, biodiversity-provider Members might 
consider introducing a rule whereby holders of patents granted under 
the legal system of that Member and based on locally obtained 
biodiversity are required to locally work the patent and, in doing so, to 
give preference to local inputs.  Failure to do so would leave them 
 
143. See Ullrich, supra note 8, at 411 n.45. 
144. See Cottier, supra note 138, at 408. 
145. See supra Part I.A.4. 
146. See Marco Ricolfi, Tutela della concorrenza, proprietà intellettuale e TRIPs, in 
ANTITRUST E GLOBALIZZAZIONE 141, 161–63 (2004). 
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subject to compulsory licensing.147 
 Also, this opinion might nevertheless be questioned by asking 
whether this sort of measure would discriminate as to fields of 
technology in a manner contrary to Article 27(1).  Article 27(1) states 
that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”148  It may be conceded 
that the envisaged measure would entail explicitly different treatment 
for the specific sector, which is usually referred to as de jure 
discrimination.149  However, this assessment may not be conclusive, 
because the extent to which the prohibition of technological 
discrimination under Article 27(1) limits the ability of Members to 
target certain technological fields in dealing with the important national 
public policies referred to in Article 8(1) requires clarification.  Indeed, 
the fact that some sectors are singled out as of “vital importance” for 
national policies under Article 8(1) by definition implies that the 
corresponding measure operates selectively rather than across-the-
board.  Thus, I suggest that under a TRIPs general principles-based 
interpretation, Article 27(1) may not altogether negate Article 8(1), and 
vice versa. While Article 27(1) belongs to the core of patent protection 
and cannot be subverted by local working measures applying across-the-
board, the converse also applies:  if the development component 
expressly authorized by TRIPs is not to become altogether meaningless, 
then the general rule under Article 27(1) may be subject to the explicit 
derogation under Article 8(1) if and to the extent the important national 
policies indicated therein so dictate.150 
 If this is the case, then a local working requirement confined to a 
specific sector, such as biotechnological inventions based on local 
biodiversity, should be deemed TRIPs-compatible.  The conclusion that 
 
147. For a full treatment of this issue, see Ghidini, supra note 138, at 45–46.  On 
preference for local content, see also Odman, supra note 11, at 349. 
148. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1) (emphasis added). 
149. See Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.94, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, Canada]. 
150. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, 
at 434–36.  See Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210, WT/DS174/R 
(Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report, European Communities] (stating that “many 
measures [under Article 8(1)] to attain those public policy objectives . . . do not require an 
exception under the TRIPs Agreement”).  However, it would appear that this opinion, 
expressed obiter, does not contradict the discussion in the text, because it does not rule out 
that such measures may have an impact on the extent of IP exclusivity.  On the different 
question of the application of the antidiscrimination mandate to Article 30 TRIPs exceptions, 
see infra Part III.C.1. 
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“Art. 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems 
that may exist only in certain product areas”151 has been reached under 
the general provision dealing with exceptions to patent rights dictated 
by Article 30 of TRIPs.  The same principle should apply a fortiori 
under the sector-specific powers retained by Members under Article 
8(1).  To establish whether a specific rule, as sketched above, is a bona 
fide exception, subsequent practice of Members under Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be considered.152  In 
this connection, reference should be made to Articles 1, 8(j), 16 and 19 
of the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity of June 5, 
1992.153  The prohibition would apply, however, in the event the 
technological specificity translates into a violation of the overriding 
mandate of national treatment under Article 3, because a general 
principles-based interpretation of TRIPs may not conceivably conflict 
with this overarching norm of international IP.154 
 What can one make out of this discussion?  The careful reader 
who has been following may have been misled into believing that, by 
referring to the admissibility of a local working requirement, I intended 
to reach the promised land of ex ante generalized rules and to contrast 
their operation to ex post and ad hoc intervention through measures 
targeting restrictions in international transfer of technology discussed in 
the previous paragraph.  The difficulty with this is that the distinction 
between ex ante rules and ex post measures is in some way germane to 
the distinction between regulation and antitrust intervention.  It has 
been said that “unlike antitrust policies, which tell businesses what not 
 
151. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.92. 
152. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention forms part of the “customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law” within the meaning of Article 3(2) of the DSU.  
See DSU, supra note 45, art. 3(2). 
153. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
822 (1992). 
154. An additional difficulty arises when we address the question of remedies to failure 
to locally work a patent.  Should the remedy take the form of liability to compulsory 
licensing, as assumed throughout this section, then one would have to come to terms with the 
idea that the provision dealing with compulsory licensing, Article 31, is mandatory and, 
therefore, does not allow for any difference in the technical field of its application.  See Panel 
Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.90.  There are reasons to doubt that this opinion, even if 
authoritatively endorsed by a panel decision, is persuasive, because Article 31 has to be read 
jointly with the other provisions of TRIPs, including Article 8(1).  Remedial action, to which 
subjection to compulsory licensing would amount to, is normally believed to be left to 
Members’ discretion more than substantive IP provisions.  Even those who subscribe to the 
stricter opinion should then consider whether other remedies, such as a bar on exercising 
patent rights (as in patent misuse cases), would be TRIPs-compliant. 
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to do, regulation tells businesses what to do and how to price 
products.”155  However, the distinction between affirmative and 
negative, between order and prohibition, is not always that clear-cut, as 
shown in the case of prohibition of refusals to deal on dominant or 
monopolistic firms, which may indeed be construed also as an 
affirmative duty to negotiate.  Looking carefully at local working 
requirements, one will find a similar ambiguity.  The requirement has an 
affirmative side to it:  it mandates patentees to manufacture locally.  But 
what happens in the event the patentee fails to do so?  The remedy, 
compulsory licensing, is conceptualized as a consequence of failure to 
locally work so that we do not know exactly whether we are dealing 
here with an ex ante rule or an ex post measure.  To link with the 
analysis proposed earlier,156 we should probably focus on a separate 
feature by asking whether the legal consequence envisaged by the 
applicable law is generalized or ad hoc.  Here, the operational question 
is more straightforward.  Are we talking about a self-enforcing feature 
that is automatic in its legal consequences and does not require for its 
actual implementation a specific intervention by a court or another 
decision-making body?  Or are we talking about a rule that becomes 
effective only after a decision by the competent authority?  In the 
former case, we are talking about a generalized rule; the latter is ad hoc 
intervention. 
 In this latter perspective, the place of local working requirements 
in international intellectual property is relatively clear.  They may 
possibly be considered a measure specifically targeting restrictions in 
international technology transfer by mandating local working.  They 
also provide an incentive to the flow of technology in the jurisdiction 
and a correlative disincentive to its restriction.  But, this is only a matter 
of linguistic choice without normative consequences.  What is 
normatively relevant here is that the remedy in case of failure to meet 
the mandate is usually conceptualized in terms of liability to compulsory 
licensing,157 and that this form of remedial action is not automatic.  
Rather, it may not be administered by the legal system of the relevant 
jurisdiction without a specific, ad hoc intervention by a pre-determined 
authority under Articles 31(a), 31(i) and 31(j) of TRIPs.  Indeed, to 
 
155. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS 198 (17th 
ed. 2001). 
156. See supra Part I.B.4. 
157. For a discussion about whether this remedy is TRIPs-compliant and on the 
available alternatives, see supra note 154. 
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come across pure ex ante, generalized rules shall wait until we come to 
what I earlier described as regime design fine-tuning. 
B.  Antitrust Intervention 
1.  Refusal to Deal 
People are familiar with thinking of refusal to deal as an antitrust 
issue.  But, of course, there are circumstances under which we might as 
well visualize an IP-related refusal to deal as a practice adversely 
affecting the international transfer of technology. 
It has been argued that Members’ laws may provide for a remedy, be 
it compulsory licensing or some kind of antitrust-specific relief in the 
event an IP holder refuses to license his technology “on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions.”158  I disagree; this kind of rule would 
not be TRIPs-compliant. 
It is certain we cannot find a legal basis for this argument in Article 
31(b).  This provision refers to “reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions;” but, it does so for an entirely different purpose, that is, to 
clarify that no compulsory license may be granted if the would-be 
licensee has failed to make efforts to obtain a voluntary license “on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions.” 
Even from a competition law perspective, subsection (k) of Article 
31, while dispensing from the requirement of prior bona fide 
negotiations under subsection (b), requires that a specific “anti-
competitive practice” is established on the basis of an individualized 
judicial or administrative decision. 
I submit that the anti-competitive character of the practice cannot be 
found in the refusal to deal per se but must consist in separate restrictive 
features in the relevant behavior of the IP holder.  This additional 
requirement is both a consequence of the wording of Article 8(2) of 
TRIPs, which envisages the prevention of “abuse of intellectual 
property rights,” and a necessary implication of the mandate of TRIPs-
compliance, specifically iterated in this same provision.  Indeed, under 
TRIPs, IP rights are conceived as exclusive property rights that are 
protected under a most emphatic enunciation of property rules.159  Such 
 
158. Correa, supra note 66, at 490. 
159. In the notion explored in its general dimension by the classical work by Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:  One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124–25 (1972), and developed in the IP field 
by Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
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an exclusivity, by its very definition, implies that the holder has the dual 
prerogatives of authorizing third parties to use the IP and withholding 
such an authorization. 
Of course, we may question the wisdom of this arrangement.  The 
argument whereby property rules are an efficient initial entitlement that 
not only provide an incentive to supply scarce public goods but also 
open up the avenue to value maximizing voluntary exchanges is based 
on a number of assumptions.  These assumptions quite frequently do 
not materialize in connection with novel forms of technological 
innovation, as it is eloquently proved by inefficient developments in the 
areas of biotechnology and digital innovation.160  I certainly share these 
views and accordingly support the expansion of liability rules in a 
number of areas of IP.  Nevertheless, as a matter of interpretation of the 
law as it stands, I also believe that we must acknowledge that TRIPs 
conceives of IP rights as unequivocally protected under a black letter 
property rule, that is, an entitlement that in European parlance is both 
absolute erga omnes (protected against all the world) and in rem. 
Accordingly, refusal to deal in IP is a mode of exercise of the right 
that is expressly safeguarded by TRIPs.  Therefore, in the absence of 
additional and separate anti-competitive elements, Members may not 
consider a refusal to deal abusive and outlaw it on competition law 
grounds or any other grounds.161 
It would appear that this conclusion may not be questioned by 
invoking a general principles-based approach.162  Indeed, neither 
incorporation of pro-competitive inputs nor consideration of non-IP 
interests may subvert the fundamental choice of TRIPs to protect IP 
under property rules.  Neither Article 8(2) nor the other provisions 
listed above in Part I.A.1 authorize Members to transform property 
rules into liability rules by resorting to the kind of ad hoc, ex post 
 
2655 (1994).  The “grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts” is described as the 
“fundamental feature of intellectual property protection” by the Panel Report, European 
Communities, supra note 150, ¶ 7.210. 
160. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:  The 
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 450–55 (1995) (noting that the theory 
favoring property rules builds on the assumption that (1) transaction costs of market 
exchange are low and (2) the candidates to the exchange are few, ideally just two, in such a 
way that problems associated with strategic behavior (hold-outs, free riding) are minimized 
or, even better, altogether avoided).  Similar points had originally made by Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 159, at 1125, 1127. 
161. See also Ullrich, supra note 8, at 410–11. 
162. But the conclusion proposed in the text is far from settled.  On the various 
positions, see Dwyer, supra note 49, at 474–75, 535–36. 
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measure discussed here.  Similarly, even after having made the point 
that a whole gamut of antitrust laws is TRIPs-compatible, one cannot 
escape the conclusion that none of them can justify a per se prohibition 
of a refusal to deal in IP.163 
2.  Is IP an Essential Facility? 
But then, what are the separate anti-competitive elements that 
would make a prohibition of a refusal to deal in IP TRIPs-compliant?  
This depends very much on which of the many acceptable varieties of 
antitrust comes into play.  The answers may vary greatly, depending on 
the fundamental features of each legal system. 
So, European competition law forbids refusal to deal only to the 
extent that (1) there is a position of dominance in the market for which 
the IP right gives protection in the first place, (2) the refusal has the 
effect of preventing any competition in a new downstream market, and 
(3) the refusal itself is not otherwise justified.164 
As far as TRIPs is concerned, the antitrust prohibition of a refusal to 
deal in IP would appear to require, at a minimum, the finding of an 
element of market power in the IP holder based on economic evidence 
other than the legal monopoly granted by IP protection.  Indeed, it is 
well-settled that, while IP exclusive rights by definition give their 
holders legal monopoly over the protected creation, their position, from 
an economic standpoint, may well be subject to competition from one or 
more substitutes.  This is a most common occurrence, as shown by the 
fact that the relevant legal systems usually do not even institute a prima 
facie presumption that legal monopoly also entails economic market 
power.165  Therefore, if a Member’s antitrust laws forbade a refusal to 
deal in IP on the sole basis of the legal monopoly granted by IP, even in 
the absence of a finding of economic market power, such a rule would 
once again transform property rule protected IP into entitlements 
protected under a liability rule and, therefore, turn out to be 
substantially equivalent to the one we found incompatible with TRIPs in 
the previous paragraph.166 
 
163. See supra Part II.A.2. 
164. See Case 4181/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. 
KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039. 
165. For the E.U. system, see Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55.  For the 
U.S. system, see Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992). 
166. However, the opposite view is expressed by Ullrich, supra note 8, at 407 n.24. 
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In addition to a finding of economic dominance, is there a 
behavioral element required by TRIPs before a refusal to deal in IP may 
be forbidden by Members’ antitrust laws?  Probably so, unless one is 
prepared to argue that IP held by firms with market power may be 
different from all other IP in that the former is protected under a 
liability rule while the latter under a property rule.  Such a proposition 
would seem to run directly counter to TRIPs-mandated minimum 
uniform standards of IP protection and would also be incompatible with 
the wording of Article 8(2), which specifically allows for measures 
intended to prevent “abuse” of IP.167 
If this may appear to be a strict rule, then we should consider that 
this additional behavioral element may be satisfied under a quite large 
number of different options.  In the European Union, the behavioral 
component is found in the presence of an abuse of dominant position 
that is triggered when the refusal to deal by the IP holder amounts to an 
exercise of exclusionary power in connection with a separate, 
downstream market for which the IP asset is a necessary input.168  In the 
United States, a finding of leverage into downstream markets or other 
anti-competitive behavior is required by case law.169  These two formulas 
might be further fleshed out by suggesting the appropriateness of 
antitrust scrutiny in standards-dominated markets170 or in situations in 
which a sector-specific IP is used to obtain disproportionate leverage in 
vertical or complementary markets.171 
However, I would very much hesitate before concluding that these 
approaches identify the outward boundaries of admissibility of antitrust 
intervention in this context.  Indeed, earlier it was noted that the 
spectrum of TRIPs-compliant antitrust choices is wide; thus, I suggested 
 
167. One way to read the position taken by Ullrich is that TRIPs allows for rules 
concerning abuse even in absence of (absolute or relative) market power.  Ullrich, supra note 
8, at 407 n.24.  This position would indeed escape the objection I raised earlier (and might 
well be compatible with the position I developed on the varieties of antitrust supra Part 
II.A.2). 
168. See IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. at I-5039.  For a thoughtful analysis of the prior line 
of cases in this are, see MELI, supra note 109, at 106–23, 161–63, 203–42. 
169. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).  
For a discussion of the rather intricate line of cases in this area, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET 
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1018–24 (3d ed. 2003). 
170. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 568–79 (2003). 
171. See Robert P. Merges, Who Owns the Charles River Bridge?  Intellectual Property 
and Competition in the Software Industry (U.C. Berkeley Public Law & Legal Theory,  
Working Paper No. 15, Nov. 1999), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
208089. 
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that even different assessment criteria might turn out to be acceptable in 
this perspective.  Then, would a “fairness” standard be acceptable in this 
area?  Probably, if one considers that fairness concerns have 
traditionally been part and parcel of what we initially conceived as 
antitrust goals, even though this approach ceased to be fashionable on 
our shores maybe thirty or even forty years ago.  And, this affirmative 
conclusion should be reinforced if we take into account, as we should, 
that a general principles-based approach to assess TRIPs-compatibility 
is also supposed to incorporate into the analysis non-IP interests, 
including a development component that may be far from irrelevant 
when the issue of access to prior technology is at stake. 
Again, this is not to say that what is TRIPs-compatible is also 
appropriate and well-advised.  Far from it.  Indeed, there are several 
difficulties that systematically arise any time antitrust scrutiny is applied 
to the decision by an IP holder not to make his asset available to 
interested third parties.  First, antitrust is, as we earlier saw, a form of ex 
post and ad hoc measure.  It is enforced on a case-by-case basis by a 
court or an administrative agency.  While a regulatory agency may set in 
advance a schedule of interconnection fees for the use of an essential 
facility, such as a network, and do so on a principled basis that may 
apply to a large number of different situations,172 antitrust-mandated 
access to an IP asset is bound to be the outcome of a quite different 
exercise, which is rooted in a two-party and adversarial context rather 
than a regulatory context.  This may be indispensable in some very 
specific cases; however, it hardly makes for consistent and predictable 
results.173 
Second, in the present legal environment, antitrust is either national 
or regional, rather than international.  IP assets subject to antitrust 
scrutiny may be—or, rather, tend quite often to be—held by firms that 
are nationals of a legal system that is different from the one to which the 
relevant antitrust authority belongs.  Thus, lack of predictability and 
inconsistency over time may translate in international, even “political” 
 
172. William J. Baumol, A ciascuno il tuo:  concorrenza e servizio universale, 1 
CONCORRENZA, MERCATO E REGOLE 65 (1999). 
173. Now and then, the idea emerges that resorting to the patent misuse doctrine may 
yield better results.  See Merges, supra note 171, § 3.2.1.  I agree, as the doctrine, implying the 
lesser remedy of unenforceability of the IP rights, rather than full antitrust remedies, does not 
require the kind of fact-intensive finding that is necessary for antitrust purposes.  I would also 
suggest carefully considering proposals to extend the misuse doctrine to copyright (following 
the proposal by Chip Patterson, Copyright Misuse and Modified Copyleft:  New Solutions to 
the Challenges of Internet Standardization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1351 (2000)) and, especially, its 
adoption by European courts. 
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tensions. 
In such a universe, identifying the additional behavioral component 
by reference to fairness standards that are vague, open-ended, and 
accordingly open to second-guessing of discriminatory motives may 
exacerbate these difficulties.  But it would appear that this risk makes 
the standard unadvisable, rather than clearly TRIPs-incompatible. 
Similar conclusions may be reached in assessing the feasibility of 
applying what is generally termed essential facilities doctrine (EFD) to 
issues of access to IP.  EFD contemplates the possibility of granting 
competitors access to a resource that is unique and cannot be duplicated 
by enterprises in a market position comparable to the holder of the 
facility.  This possibility emerges when such access is indispensable for 
competitors to operate in separate markets located downstream from 
the resource itself.  If this resource is an IP right, one is faced with the 
same difficulties we encountered in connection with an outright refusal 
to deal.  This difficulty remains even in the cases in which all the 
requirements for antitrust intervention are met.174  Because the holder is 
found to have market power and to have engaged in the kind of 
behavior that is deemed abusive, while TRIPs-compliance may be taken 
for granted, the difficulty still remains in that the same access-granting 
that is the everyday job of a regulatory body may turn out to be a 
nightmare for an antitrust authority.175 
C.  Regime Design Fine-Tuning 
The above discussion should lead us to a final dimension.  So far, it 
has been possible to test, with specific reference to measures specifically 
targeting restrictive behavior in international technology transfer and to 
antitrust intervention, the choices available to Members incorporating 
pro-competitive features into their IP legislation in ways that are TRIPs-
compliant. 
We have seen that the options, even if not unlimited, are quite 
 
174. See Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television 
Publ’n Ltd. v. EC Comm’n of the European Cmty., 1995 E.C.R. I-00743.  The test appears 
more restrictive in the United States.  See David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. 
Supp. 728, 753 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that “a facility is essential under the antitrust laws 
only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s individual competitive viability and the viability of 
the market in general” (emphasis added)). 
175. One of the issues that is to be faced in this connection by antitrust authorities is 
whether the remedy to refusal to deal and failure to give access to an essential facility may 
consist in the imposition of an obligation to supply advance information on the IP holder in 
the light of Article 39 of TRIPs.  Ricolfi, supra note 146, at 171–72. 
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extensive.  However, we have also seen that a legislative exercise bent 
on incorporating pro-competitive features through these two sorts of 
measures is apt to face a number of difficulties that go beyond TRIPs-
compliance.  On a number of occasions, we have come across the 
shortcomings that usually are associated with ex post, ad hoc 
intervention typical of antitrust and measures specifically targeting 
restrictive behavior in international technology transfer.  Earlier, we 
had also seen that there seems to be more general reasons why 
traditional antitrust law faces unprecedented difficulties in dealing with 
the challenges posed by novel forms of IP protection.176 
Now, the time has come to explore whether any of these difficulties 
may be remedied by resorting to forms of intervention other than ex 
post, ad hoc measures, and if this may happen in a TRIPs-compliant 
fashion.  Thus, this Article will finally look at that form of generalized 
ex ante intervention that was earlier indicated as regime design fine-
tuning.  In this connection, the specific issue of the availability of fair 
use defenses with regard to software patents may prove particularly 
instructive. 
1.  Software Patents and Fair Uses 
It is well-known that digital innovation, initially protected under 
copyright,177 is currently deemed to qualify for patent protection so far 
the latter regimes’ access requirements are met.  This conclusion has 
been reached more or less simultaneously in the United States and in 
Europe.178 In Europe, the persisting dualism between supranational 
grant of patent rights and their domestic enforcement induced E.U. 
authorities to propose a harmonization directive specifically dealing 
with “computer implemented inventions.”179 
These parallel developments raised a number of questions, 
 
176. See supra Part II.B.2. 
177. Of course, the history of protection of computer programs is much longer and 
more complicated than indicated in the stylized account supplied in the text.  For the initial 
resort to contract and trade secret protection in the United States prior to the 1976 Copyright 
Act, see Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft:  Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1493–95 (1997). 
178. Compare State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Servs., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999), with In re Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 31 IIC 189 
(2000). 
179. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM (2002) 92 final (Feb. 
20, 2002) (rejected by the European Parliament in second reading (June 6, 2005)) [hereinafter 
Draft Directive]. 
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particularly in the area of exceptions to exclusivity.180 
This is so because software had come to be regarded as a special case 
as far as fair use defenses to copyright protection are concerned.  
Indeed, when E.U. Council Directive 91/250 was adopted to harmonize 
software protection throughout Europe,181 it was felt that it was 
necessary to give downstream program developers a guarantee as to 
their freedom to decompile earlier programs and to make the former 
interconnected and interoperable with the latter.182  A broadly 
equivalent outcome had earlier been reached in the United States by 
courts rather than by legislative action.183  In either case, the availability 
of specialized fair use defenses in the field of software was based on the 
assumption that the preservation of a corresponding area of freedom is 
a necessary incident of the special features of programs that, as a rule, 
can be looked at as the building blocks of larger multi-component 
products and quite often of networks, rather than discrete, self-sufficient 
products. 
Freedom of decompilation, interconnection and interoperability 
proved in the meantime of crucial importance to the emergence and 
successful operation of open-source software.  The “wide galaxy,” which 
is known under this label, resorts to a combination of copyright 
protection and contract to make sure that source code is made available 
to all recipients of open software and that no separate compensation is 
requested for its use.  Even so, open source still needs to interconnect 
and be interoperable with dominant proprietary software in order to be 
commercially viable.  The availability of the specialized fair use defense 
was essential to make these acts a form of admissible use, rather than 
infringement of proprietary software. 
Now, the superimposition of an additional, patent-based layer of 
protection for computer programs is an elaborate but precarious 
balancing exercise.  This is so because an act that would have 
 
180. For a concise treatment, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Examining State Street 
Bank:  Developments in Business Method Patenting, in COMPUTER UND RECHT 
INTERNATIONAL 1 (2001), and Alex Clellan, Novelty, Inventive Step and Computer-
Implemented Inventions, in I BREVETTI PER INVENZIONE FRA DIRITTO EUROPEO E DIRITTO 
NAZIONALE 61 (Marco Ricolfi ed., 2004). 
181. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L122) 42 (EC) (providing legal 
protection for computer programs). 
182. See id. arts. 1(2), 5, 6, 9. 
183. For a comparative account of the solutions adopted in the United States and the 
European Union, see Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPs on the Information Superhighway:  
International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL. 
L. REV. 207, 232–52 (1996). 
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constituted a fair use under software-adapted copyright law may or may 
not be covered by what in U.S. and E.U. patent laws is known as 
experimental use defense or research exemption.  Depending on the 
legal system and court, there is remarkably varying latitude given to this 
defense.184  Thus, the use may constitute a patent infringement as soon 
as the downstream product is marketed, even in situations in which 
under copyright law interoperability and interconnection defenses 
would be available. 
This is the reason why it was felt by the drafters of the now defunct 
E.U. Draft Directive that downstream program producers should enjoy 
a broader, sector-specific exception even in connection with patent law.  
This belief mirrors the corresponding specialized fair use defenses 
available under copyright law.  This is an interesting concept that 
deserves being closely analyzed, even though the legislative initiative 
that adopted it has in the meantime been killed.  I have argued 
elsewhere that the language proposed in the Draft Directive was not apt 
to reach the intended outcome.185  However, before dealing with the 
issue of language adequacy, we should ask whether a sector-specific 
exception to patent rights that intended to carve out of patent 
exclusivity a perimeter of freedom tailored to the specific needs of 
downstream innovators in a given industry would be in compliance with 
Articles 27 and 30 of TRIPs in the first place. 
Admittedly, this is not an easy question, but one that, on balance, 
should be answered in the affirmative. 
In this specific context, the assessment of TRIPs-compliance has to 
be made in the light of the provisions of both Articles 27 and 30 because 
the latter provision is specifically devoted to laying down the 
requirements that are to be met if an exception to patent exclusivity is 
to be deemed acceptable.  For its part, the former provision directly 
impacts on the admissible scope of limitations and exceptions by 
forbidding “discrimination as to . . . the field of technology” in 
connection with the scope of patent protection, which is the reverse of 
provisions regarding exceptions and limitations.186 
 
184. For a comparative treatment of the scope of experimental use defense and 
research exemption in Europe and the United States, see DAVID GILAT, EXPERIMENTAL 
USE AND PATENTS (1995), and Sven J. R. Bostyn, One Patent a Day Keeps the Doctor Away?  
Patenting Human Genetic Information and Health Care, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 229, 248–49 
(2000). 
185. For a discussion of the issue and the text of a suggested provision to cure its 
inadequacies, see Ricolfi, supra note 146, 166–69 n.79. 
186. Draft Directive, supra note 179, at 18. 
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Because all of the three requirements under Article 30 have to be 
met before an exception or limitation to patent rights is to be deemed 
TRIPs-compatible, we may as well start by looking at them before 
turning to the technology-discrimination issue arising under Article 27. 
Article 30 deals with “Exceptions to Rights Conferred” and 
provides:  “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, provided that these exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
into account the legitimate interests of third parties.”187  Thus, the first 
requirement is that the exception is limited.  It is commonly understood 
that to establish whether an exception is limited, one must resort to a 
criterion that is normative, rather than economic, because the 
assessment specifically concerning economic impact is dealt with under 
the second and third requirement.188 
In this connection, it should be noted that patentee’s exclusivity over 
making, using and selling the patented device is not directly curtailed by 
the freedom to decompile and, possibly, to interconnect. 
Freedom to decompile a patent-protected computer program, in so 
far as it amounts to the reverse-engineering of a product for purposes of 
observation or study and trial within a laboratory or experimental 
context (which can be assimilated to a laboratory), does not exceed the 
well-known exception to patent exclusivity described as experimental 
use or research exemption.  While not uniformly adopted by all legal 
systems, this exemption certainly is deemed TRIPs-compliant.189 
Also, the extension to the patent field of freedom of 
interconnection, as guaranteed in the copyright context by provisions, 
should not generate problems of TRIPs-compatibility.  For instance, 
Article 1(2) of Council Directive 250/91 expressly rules out the 
protectability of ideas and principles underlying the interfaces.  In fact, 
interfaces normally consist of sequences of code that usually are not 
even included in the patent specification and may be written well after 
the filing.190  Accordingly, rules that provide for freedom of 
interconnection, rather than excluding interfaces that are patentable 
 
187. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30 (emphasis added). 
188. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶¶ 7.31, 7.32.  For a similar discussion 
in connection with Article 17, dealing with exceptions to trademark rights, see Panel Report, 
European Communities, supra note 150, ¶¶ 7.649, 7.651. 
189. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.69. 
190. See Giovanni Guglielmetti, La Proposta Di Direttiva Sulla Brevettazione Delle 
Invenzioni In Materia Di Software, 50 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 438, 461–62 (2002). 
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subject matter,191 should be deemed a “limited” exception within the  
meaning of Article 30. 
The issue may be less straightforward when assessing the TRIPs-
compatibility of freedom to use information obtained through 
decompilation and intended to achieve interoperability of a subsequent 
independently created computer program with a prior patented 
program.  Again, one should consider that later interoperable programs 
normally are complements rather than substitutes to the initial software, 
and that exclusivity over making, selling and using a patented product 
does not necessarily and, perhaps not even typically, entail exclusivity 
over complementary items.  If this is so, then even freedom of 
interoperability could conceivably be tailored in such a way as not to go 
beyond a limited exception to the exclusive rights. 
Turning to the second and third requirements, we should keep in 
mind that, as earlier indicated, the corresponding tests have an 
economic component.  Here, what should be asked to make sure that 
the exception does “not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent”192 is whether the limitation would have a 
significant negative economic impact on the market position that patent 
laws intend to bestow on a patentee.  Similarly, the question raised by 
the third requirement is whether the limitation would lead to a 
prejudice of patentee’s legitimate interests to reap the rewards 
envisaged by the legal system in conferring by patent rights.  It has been 
remarked that while the test as a whole may imply an economic 
assessment, the concept of normalcy is based on a notion that is 
normative rather than empirical.193  I agree.  Both tests are economics-
based in that they compare the situation in which the patentee finds 
herself when the exception applies with the hypothetical situation that 
would prevail when no exception was available.  However, this latter 
hypothesis is based on a normative idea that the appropriate scope of 
protection should commensurate with the rationale of the grant.  This 
approach seems to be especially clear because a reasonableness test is 
resorted to in both cases. 
If this is the appropriate approach, then to establish whether specific 
 
191. On the different status as TRIPs-compliance of subject matter exclusion as 
opposed to what is indicated as exemptions (and referred to in this text as exceptions and 
limitations), see the thoughtful comments of Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 434–43. 
192. Id. 
193. A similar point is made in Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.69, and in 
Panel Report, European Communities, supra note 150, ¶ 7.633. 
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exceptions for software patents, such as the specialized fair uses we 
earlier discussed, are acceptable, we should take into account that, while 
classical patent laws provided for protection of individual components, 
they did so on the implicit assumption that the market was based on a 
number of competing multi-component products.  Thus, a patent over a 
new brake for vehicles would not be likely to translate into a monopoly 
over cars because brand A car furnished with the patented brake would 
still be in competition with cars of brand B, C, etc.  On the contrary, in 
digital markets, the existence of competitive multi-component products 
is not to be taken for granted.  In some cases, a number of alternative 
platforms compete against each other (as it happens in connection with 
mobile phones and videogame consoles), in others there is only one 
single platform that is not subject to any competition (as it happens in 
connection with the Internet).  This is hardly surprising.  Some 
economists suggest that in digital markets, network externalities tend to 
transform competition in the market into competition for the market:  
winner takes all.194 
If we consider that, as noted earlier, programs as a rule are the 
building blocks of larger multi-component products, such as platforms 
or even networks, the questions implicit in the last two requirements are 
whether it is normal for patentee to have a chance to extend her 
monopoly from a single component to a platform and whether the same 
patentee does have a legitimate expectation to do so.  This is a 
particularly troubling question, considering that, in the digital economy, 
competing platforms may lack or, if present, be liable to come to an end 
as a result of “tipping.”  In a different setting, it has been decided that it 
is not normal for patentees to extend their monopoly beyond the term 
of protection—even if they originally had to wait for some supervisory 
approval before having the green light to initially market the patented 
product—and that they do not have a legitimate expectation to recoup 
their waiting period through such a term extension.195  I submit that the 
same conclusion should apply to the extension of monopoly from a 
single component to the multi-component product that incorporates the 
component.  This conclusion seems particularly appropriate in those 
technological fields in which the danger of disproportionate leverage 
has been clearly established.  Thus, freedoms of decompilation, 
interconnection and interoperability in the field of software patents do 
 
194. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, Antitrust and the Information Age:  Section 
2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1623, 1634–36 (2001). 
195. Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶¶ 7.61, 7.82. 
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not run afoul of the mandate of Article 30 of TRIPs. 
This is particularly so if we take into account, as required by the final 
part of Article 30, “the legitimate interests of third parties.”196  It is easy 
to connect this normative proposition to the general principles-based 
analysis we conducted above and come to the conclusion that the third 
parties’ interests that are to be taken into account herein are precisely 
the interests of current users and of new generations of innovators.197  
Indeed, current users may be prejudiced if the upstream monopoly is 
allowed to be leveraged downstream.  Downstream innovators are at 
the mercy of incumbents if they are not allowed freedom of 
decompilation, interconnection and interoperability.  In turn, this 
translates into a clear danger for the long-term efficiency of the global 
innovation system; the avoidance of which is clearly favored by TRIPs 
general principles. 
It appears remarkable in this case that pro-competitive concerns can 
be incorporated into the assessment of TRIPs-compatibility as a matter 
of course because the wording itself of Article 30 expressly refers to the 
“legitimate interests of third parties.”  However, I submit that a similar 
approach should be followed even if this specific wording were not 
available, because the corresponding guideline is generalized through 
reference in Article 7 of TRIPs to “the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of a technological knowledge” and to the favor for IP 
protection modes shaped “in a manner conducive to . . . a balance of 
rights and obligations.”198  Therefore, the final words of Article 30 must 
be read as making explicit what is implicit in the overall architecture of 
TRIPs. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that the interests of current 
users and downstream innovators might be taken into account if we 
were to test the TRIPs-compliance of an antitrust scrutiny of a refusal to 
deal by a software patent holder that denies access to his invention to 
programmers of complementary products.199  Therefore, it would appear 
inconsistent if Members were allowed to take into account those 
interests in connection with ex post, ad hoc interventions on IP but were 
not allowed to do so in connection with generalized ex ante measures.  
Probably, this kind of argument may have a grain of truth to it; however, 
I would be reluctant to make too much of it for reasons that I will 
 
196. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30. 
197. See supra Part I.B.4. 
198. See supra Part I.B.2. 
199. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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discuss in item (3) of the Conclusion.  I argue that an antitrust remedy 
to refusal to deal in IP is based on an individualized finding of anti-
competitive behavior, and that there is no way to make a generalized 
assumption that failure to assent to decompilation, interconnection and 
interoperability amount per se to abusive behavior.  Thus, the parallel 
to antitrust cannot carry, by itself, decisive weight, even though it may 
corroborate the outcome reached on other grounds and on the basis of 
an analysis of Article 30. 
It seems to me that this line of argument also disposes of the 
objections that might be raised on the basis of the mandate of 
technological neutrality under Article 27 of TRIPs.  Indeed, targeted 
exemptions, as the ones I just discussed, may be based on important 
national public policies declared relevant under Article 8(1).  If this is 
the case, the fact that some sectors are singled-out as of “vital 
importance” for national policies under Article 8(1) by definition 
implies that the measure based on this same provision may operate 
selectively rather than across-the-board.  This is so because a TRIPs 
general principles-based interpretation of Article 27(1) may not 
altogether negate Article 8(1), and vice versa.  After all, as shown 
above, “Art. 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with 
problems that may exist only in certain product areas.”200  Moreover, 
nothing would prevent Members to resort to ex post antitrust scrutiny of 
behavior of IP holders intended to use a sector-specific IP right to 
leverage a vertical or complementary market.  Thus, it may be argued 
once again, if only to corroborate this conclusion, Article 27 may not be 
an obstacle to Members’ choice to pursue the goal of keeping vertical or 
complementary markets open to competition by means of an ex ante, 
generalized measure, such as a targeted exception. 
So, sector-specific exceptions for software patents would be TRIPs-
compliant.  This conclusion may sound a bit anti-climatic at the present 
time, considering that the E.U. Draft Directive on software patents was 
just defeated.  I do not think this is the case. 
First, because, as indicated above, thousands of software patents are 
being currently granted in Europe and will continue to be granted in the 
future notwithstanding the rejection of the proposed Draft Directive.  In 
this context, the introduction of an exception to patent exclusivity 
mirroring the specialized fair uses available in connection with copyright 
protected software is probably a necessity, and at a minimum, very 
 
200. See Panel Report, Canada, supra note 149, ¶ 7.92. 
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advisable.  And, as I am afraid that European courts are likely to prove 
quite hesitant in this regard, it appears appropriate for the E.U. 
Commission to step in, while relinquishing the rest of the rejected Draft 
Directive, and to restart the whole legislative process in order to 
introduce this one bit of legislation. 
Second, because the exception we have been discussing is a nice case 
of what the Article called regime design fine-tuning, it has a few more 
general lessons we might be interested in learning.  This is what this 
Article shall try to do in the following concluding remarks. 
CONCLUSION:  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
This Article dealt with the software patent specific exception as a 
case of regime design fine-tuning.  This seems to make sense when 
applying the criteria proposed earlier.  This kind of measure would work 
ex ante rather than ex post, because it consists of a rule that provides 
advance notice of the classes of behavior that remain open to third 
parties even in the absence of consent by patentees.  Moreover, the rule 
is self-enforcing because it does not require any further intervention by 
a State authority to achieve its purpose.  At the same time, this same 
rule is generalized because it applies to all third parties—and to all 
patentees—who find themselves in a pre-determined situation; that is, 
they are engaged in decompiling, interconnecting or making and selling 
interoperable programs that interfere with patented software.  
However, this is not an ad hoc measure because the conclusion is not 
rooted in a particularized two-party and adversarial set of 
circumstances.  Finally, the re-balancing undertaken is “interstitial” 
because it does not seem apt to upset the basic rationale for this kind of 
protection. 
This kind of fine-tuning exercise can be undertaken by willing 
Members in a quite large number of akin situations.  In a prior study, I 
have looked at two additional study cases of regime design fine-tuning.201  
One deals with what is called “regulatory review exception” in 
connection with generic versions of patented drugs.  This exception 
concerns the opportunity for generic competitors to initiate clinical 
trials and testing before expiration of the controlling patent to obtain 
marketing approval effective after the term of protection.  The other 
exception deals with access requirements in the field of biotechnological 
 
201. See Ricolfi, supra note 146, at 163–66.  In connection with this area, see Panel 
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patents:  the requirement of industrial application, that is, the European 
equivalent to what in the United States conceptualizes as utility.  This 
field may be fine-tuned in a TRIPs-compliant way in order to make sure 
that the scope of protection does not unduly block further research. 
Of course, this is only just a beginning.  Members, if willing, may 
engage in many additional exercises in fine-tuning.  As indicated earlier, 
Members are likely to have good reasons to do so.  As far as developing 
Members are concerned, the incentive should be pretty clear by now.202  
Even the United States, Europe, Japan and other industrialized 
countries should have sufficient grounds to start working in this 
direction to ensure that the engine of innovation does not grind to a 
halt,203 particularly if we believe that current innovation-oriented 
competition policy is insufficient to guarantee the degree of competitive 
openness likely to be required in innovation markets.204 
Of course, the crucial task for Members interested in engaging in 
this exercise is to make sure that in doing so they respect the mandate of 
TRIPs-compatibility.  It is quite likely that appropriate criteria to make 
this sort of assessment will eventually emerge on the basis of a sufficient 
number of test cases.  However, it would appear that, on the basis of the 
findings accumulated thus far, we may already be in a position to make 
a few preliminary remarks. 
Indeed, it is time to come back from the specific perspective of 
regime design to the question whether and to what extent the 
interpretation and application of TRIPs norms, particularly those that 
are necessary for TRIPs-consistency, is impacted by consideration of 
pro-competitive concerns either admitted or actively encouraged by 
TRIPs itself. 
In this connection, a few remarks seem appropriate: 
(1) Consideration of the legitimate interests of third parties 
expressly referred to in Article 30 to assess whether the admissibility of 
an exception to patent exclusivity can and should be generalized in the 
evaluation of TRIPs-compliance of other exceptions as well as of other 
features of regime design, such as access requirements and scope of 
protection.  This is so because consideration of non-IP interests, such as 
access claims to IP staked by current users and future generations of 
innovators, is explicitly suggested by general principles analysis.  For 
 
202. See supra Part II.B.1. 
203. In a similar vein, see Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 432, 447–48.  The 
authors advocate greater fluidity in reading TRIPs in view of preserving the public domain. 
204. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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instance, Article 7 of TRIPs references “the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of a technological knowledge” and the favor for IP 
protection modes shaped “in a manner conducive to . . . a balance of 
rights and obligations.”205 
For the purpose of establishing what is the net outcome of 
protection that is non-negotiable, a modicum of balancing between IP- 
and non-IP interests is allowed under a TRIPs general principles-based 
interpretation.  In this regard, one should also take into account that 
TRIPs in the area at the intersection between IP and competition builds 
on an architecture based on authorization plus reticence, which suggests 
that Members can retain a sufficient amount of flexibility required for 
that balancing act without necessarily violating mandatory minimum 
standards. 
(2) Another contribution towards clarification of the issue of TRIPs-
compliance can be derived from the discussion of the mandate of 
technological neutrality under Article 27(1) that has cropped-up in 
connection with both local working requirements and software patents.  
In this connection, it has appeared that even a technology-specific 
feature of regime design might be reconciled with the principle of 
technological neutrality under a general principles-based interpretation.  
This approach suggests that when problems exist only in certain product 
areas, and these involve important national public policies under Article 
8(1), even measures or rules operating selectively may be TRIPs-
compliant. 
(3) What would have much more far-reaching consequences would 
be the possibility of arguing for a sort of “equivalency” of antitrust 
intervention and regime design fine-tuning.  One could indeed make the 
case that Members have the option of exerting the powers they retain at 
the intersection between IP and competition either through antitrust 
measures or by regime design fine-tuning.  In doing so, they have a 
choice as to the kind of measure from time to time selected.  Therefore, 
whatever outcome may be reached through ex post antitrust 
intervention can also be obtained by ex ante and generalized rules 
concerning access requirements, scope of protection, exceptions and the 
like. 
If this approach were acceptable, it would support some kind of 
“strong form” equivalency between different pro-competitive measures 
allowed for by TRIPs, the consequences of which would be rather 
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sweeping.  Indeed, we have had a chance to look at the remarkably wide 
extent of flexibility retained by Members at the intersection of 
competition and IP.206  We have also argued that this flexibility is 
enhanced rather than restricted by TRIPs general principles analysis.207  
Further, we concluded that the spectrum of TRIPs-compliant models 
that can be adopted in the field of classical competition or antitrust law 
is very broad.208  In terms of practical impact, strong form equivalency 
would mean that one should not worry too much if classic competition 
law has in the meantime become obsolete, because what was lost in 
terms of antitrust may entirely be regained by recycling it through a 
well-tempered, fine-tuning exercise. 
However, it is doubtful whether one can make this kind of argument 
because ex ante and generalized measures are not perfect equivalents to 
ex post and ad hoc measures for purposes of TRIPs-compliance.  In 
some regards, the former may be preferable to the latter even in terms 
of furthering TRIPs-specific goals, such as predictability of outcomes 
and non-discrimination among IP holders of different nationalities, for 
the reasons discussed earlier.209  On the other hand, as hinted in the 
previous paragraph, one cannot disregard the fact that the legitimacy of 
ex post and ad hoc measures is rooted in a two-party, adversarial 
context.  In antitrust, the intervention is legitimate insofar as it is a 
reaction to specific behavior that may be considered either restrictive 
(for bilateral behavior) or abusive (for unilateral behavior) under fact-
intensive circumstances as established through a finding by a decision-
making authority.  Ex ante generalized rules are different; they are 
automatic consequences of a legally typical set of circumstances rather 
than a remedy to unlawful behavior.  Accordingly, unlawful behavior 
cannot be assumed as typical without fact-finding by a specific authority 
in an adversarial context.  After all, this is the kind of reasoning that 
earlier induced us to conclude that there cannot be a remedy against a 
refusal to deal in IP unless specific evidence of additional and separate 
anti-competitive behavior is found.210 
Therefore, it would seem that there may be cases in which TRIPs 
enables Members to further pro-competitive concerns only through one 
form of intervention—antitrust—even though it does not allow for the 
 
206. See supra Part I.A.3. 
207. See supra Part I. B.3–4. 
208. See supra Part II.A.2. 
209. See supra Parts I.B.4., III.C.1. 
210. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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generalization of this measure by the adoption of an ex ante rule.  The 
latter would dispense from the finding of specific inadmissible behavior 
by the competent authority. 
This does not amount to saying that pro-competitive concerns are 
relevant only for purposes of antitrust intervention and for the 
assessment of their TRIPs-compatibility.  Far from it.  On the contrary, 
a general principles-based analysis helps highlight the extent in which 
this horizontal, pro-competitive feature of TRIPs is relevant to the 
assessment of measures targeting restrictive behavior in international 
transfer of technology and regime design fine-tuning.  The point I am 
making is that this same horizontal feature has its own limits.  Some 
kind of intervention may be based on specific requirements that must be 
established in ways that cannot possibly be replicated in connection with 
different forms of measures or intervention.  Thus, it would seem that 
what I earlier called “equivalency” can be adopted only in its weak 
form.  This weak form accepts the generalized relevance of pro-
competitive goals in the interpretation and application of all TRIPs 
provisions yet insists that careful case-by-case analysis is required before 
we may conclude that Members are, in a given context, enabled to use 
tools different from antitrust to pursue objectives that TRIPs authorizes 
only in specific connection with classic antitrust intervention. 
This approach is probably apt to lead Members that might wish to 
counter IP protectionist tendencies only half-way in their effort.  Thus, 
if one is to respond to the question that forms the title of this Article, 
then the response is likely to be in the negative.  The conclusions 
reached here cannot in any plausible way be described as a complete 
remedy to IP overprotection.  Nevertheless, if Members decided to take 
advantage of the significant fluidity that TRIPs enables, it would still be 
a very welcome result indeed. 
 
